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ABSTRACT 
The process employed by Naval Surface Forces to capture information during 
warfare certification is enabled by a computer-based feedback mechanism. The Surface 
Force Type Commander employs two information management system models in the 
form of Training and Operational Readiness Information Service (TORIS) and Training 
Figure of Merit (TFOM) to report progress, capture data, compare trends, and achieve 
training and certification process efficiency. These systems have advantages that can be 
recognized and capitalized upon by other elements within the Ballistic Missile Defense 
community. This thesis examines how two Ballistic Missile Defense elements—Naval 
Aegis units and Army Patriot units—leverage technology to capture data as part of the 
certification timeline and the degree of alignment between the certification processes of 
the elements.  It is recommended that an initiative be undertaken to record and retain data 
associated with certification events down to a granular (unit) level. It is further 
recommended that the Patriot community in particular consider an information 
technology solution for the issue of unit-level readiness management. 
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A. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat these weapons 
pose to regional and homeland defense, pose a critical challenge to the Department of 
Defense. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has been marked by conventional 
warfare and urban insurgency to date; the exchange of ballistic missiles has not been part 
of the GWOT equation. Yet the consequences of a ballistic missile exchange are not any 
less and the likelihood of such an exchange may in fact be greater. For over thirty years 
the United States has conducted a scientifically challenging and aggressive initiative to 
mitigate this threat culminating in the fielding of the Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS). This system is the compilation of individual military service components in to 
an interoperable and responsive defensive shield.  
The ballistic missile defense capability is one of the major pieces of the 
Department of Defense’s New Triad1. Each combatant commander is responsible for the 
operation of the Ballistic Missile Defense component in their assigned region with 
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) assigned the responsibility of global coordination. 
Individual elements of the system are operated by the parent service or the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA). Strategic Command directive SD 508-8 established a program 
for the certification and qualification for operational units in December 2004.  Parent 
services provide the guidance for their elements. This paper will examine the overarching 
guidance provided to two service elements, the U.S. Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense program warships and the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Patriot Battalions. 
The parent service certification program is potentially vital to national security in the 
event of hostile missile employment.  
                                                 
1 The New Triad consists of conventional precision-guided weapons, a responsive defensive 
infrastructure, and both active and passive defensive mechanisms. The BMDS is key to the active 
mechanism leg of the Triad. “The New Triad.” http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f2c2.html. Accessed August 
11, 2008. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
One might ask what exactly does certification mean in the context of military 
readiness? The most appropriate definition is available in SD 508-8. The directive 
describes three terms: Qualification, Certification, and Mission Ready. Qualification is 
achieved by demonstrating proficiency in a particular knowledge or skill area to an 
established standard. Certification is a culminating event designating qualified crews or 
teams as approved for operational missions. Mission Ready is a Commander’s 
assessment of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF) against Joint Mission Essential Tasks. It is important to note that 
a system certification is outside the realm of the operational commander. The parent 
service levies requirements on their units to periodically demonstrate certification criteria 
as part of the larger process of force deployment.  
Using the STRATCOM directive as explicit guidance, we can explore what the 
services do with the information obtained during the typically continuous process of 
certification. The availability of information from the certification process to the parent 
service and STRATCOM is determined by the mechanisms employed by the services to 
record and monitor status. This raises the question: what mechanism is in place to allow 
for monitoring of units as they proceed through the process?  
1. Certification Process 
The Ballistic Missile Defense System is a Joint system by design. It is reasonable 
to examine the elements of the BMDS with the goal of discovering how similar the 
certification path is for the individual elements. In the case of the Aegis element, the 
Navy’s certification program is predominantly defined by the Surface Force Type 
Commander. An Air Defense Artillery Patriot Battalion will certify utilizing guidance 
from the Army Training and Doctrine Command. This thesis investigates the degree of 
alignment between these two processes and if they support Strategic Command guidance 
for the BMDS.  
  3
2.  Technology as a Knowledge Multiplier 
It is important to document the events of interest along the certification timeline 
so that this information can be used to analyze and improve the certification process and 
the supporting processes that provide resources to the warfighter. Units are required to 
report their status at regular intervals and when their status has been upgraded or 
downgraded based on readiness and materiel condition among other things. The status 
report is not a substitute for the ability to capture corporate memory. Information 
Technology offers an avenue for doing just that. In a similar vein, it is common for 
commanders at many levels to submit some form of post-event After Action or Lessons 
Learned report. While not always the case, many times these reports do not provide 
granular information on the progress of individual crews. The reports describe ‘why’ but 
not ‘who.’ This thesis examines how the two Ballistic Missile Defense elements leverage 
technology to capture information along the certification timeline.  
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides a brief history of recent treaties that shaped the missile 
defense environment and describe the change in organizational doctrine that has led to 
the unified Joint force of today. It also describes the role of the Navy and the Army in 
missile defense, with particular emphasis on the Aegis and Patriot platforms. 
Chapter III reviews the literature that governs the certification process of the 
overall Ballistic Missile Defense System. The scope will include the overarching 
guidance down to the unit level instructions that provide the Component Commanders 
with certified forces. 
Chapter IV examines the concept of corporate memory and how the Aegis and 
Patriot community capture data during the certification process for future use by 
readiness managers. This chapter also covers models that define process maturity that 
may be relevant when attempting to discover where a given certification process is at 
present. 
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Chapter V summarizes the research and provides recommendations based on the 
results of that research. The thesis concludes with recommendations for further study. 
D.  THESIS METHODOLOGY 
The Ballistic Missile Defense System is complex and an evaluation of the system 
from any number of views can be problematic due to the collaborative approach for 
development and operation employed by the Missile Defense Agency and the military 
services. The system is actually a system of systems with a global span. This thesis will 
focus on only two elements of the system, chosen by maturity and capability. The Aegis 
warship and the Patriot battalion share similar missions and capability. Additionally, both 
components are unit level assets with similar training and deployment requirements. 
This thesis examines the certification requirements that pertain to the chosen 
elements described above. These requirements include those levied by U.S. Strategic 
Command, a functional Component Commander, and the service-specific process for 
‘deployability.’ The investigation focuses on the process at the macro level and the 
measures used to assess proficiency.  A secondary focus is examination of the means by 
which the unit or service captures relevant data in the process of certification and the 





A. MISSILE DEFENSE 
The modern history of Ballistic Missile Defense can be traced to the Cold War-
era Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Derided as an expensive pipe dream by critics and 
hailed as a bulwark against the Soviet nuclear threat by supporters, SDI was a much-
discussed item from the Reagan era defense establishment. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 seemed to mark the end of the space-based missile defense discussion at 
the national and international level. However, advances in technology, particularly 
missile technology, and the availability of this type of weaponry to ‘rogue’ nations, 
terrorist groups and even global competitors have made the subject of missile defense, 
space-based or not, a topic of interest once again.  
The approved architecture of SDI during its initial phase included six major 
systems:  
a space-based interceptor (SBI), a ground-based interceptor, a ground-
based sensor, two space-based sensors, and a battle management system. 
This architecture provided a structure to guide further refinement of 
missile defense components that would in turn be integrated into and 
improve the architecture through an iterative process.2  
This architecture would have presumably denied the enemy the ability to 
communicate, provide imagery, and provide warning of impending intercontinental 
missile strike by negating satellite assets. This provoked controversy domestically and 
internationally as it seemed to upset the nuclear stalemate of ‘mutually assured 
destruction’ as well as elevate the Cold War from the confines of the Earth and spread it 
to the neutrality of space. The implementation of SDI never blossomed as originally 
conceived as the end of the Soviet Union changed the focus of national military strategy. 
Terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 altered the perception of the missile shield 
concept as homeland defense and security took on added importance to the United States.  
                                                 
2 “ Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History.” http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/briefhis.html. 
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In December 2002, President G. W. Bush signed into effect National Security 
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 23 directing the United States Defense Department, via the 
Office of Secretary of Defense, to “deploy a set of missile defense capabilities beginning 
in 2004.”3 This executive action proposed for the deployment of an “initial set of 
capabilities that…evolve to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of 
technological developments.” Specific mention was made of sea-based and space-based 
deployment. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program of the U.S. Navy was able to 
leverage existing Aegis technology to meet the directives intent. NSPD 23 also directed 
the procurement of additional U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 units, strengthening that 
community’s ability to provide air defense against theater missiles. The Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) took on the burden of executing the directive’s intent with the mission: 
…to develop, test and prepare for deployment a missile defense system. 
Using complementary interceptors, land-, sea-, air- and space-based 
sensors, and battle management command and control systems, the 
planned missile defense system will be able to engage all classes and 
ranges of ballistic missile threats…(The) programmatic strategy is to 
develop, rigorously test, and continuously evaluate production, 
deployment and operational alternatives for the ballistic missile defense 
system. Missile defense systems being developed and tested by MDA are 
primarily based on hit-to-kill technology.
4  
Merging the individual pieces of the above systems into an overall Ballistic 
Missile Defense system presented, and still presents, a considerable challenge. Not 
surprisingly, the parent services assumed responsibility for their portion of the system. 
Organizations that train and certify operational units have added significance in this 
construct. More specifically, the certification process enacted by the parent service, or 
parent community in some cases, takes on the significance of national defense vice unit 
or force defense. These processes are not Joint by design yet the units that certified via 
these processes are modules within a system of systems, the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System. It is imperative that a degree of alignment exists among the various certification 
processes. Jointness is required to address the global missile threat.  
                                                 
3 NSPD 23 December 16, 2002. 
4 “MDA Mission.” http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/aboutus.html. 
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B. TREATIES 
It is inappropriate to have a legitimate discussion concerning Ballistic Missile 
Defense without including mention of applicable treaties to which the United States has 
been a party to. These treaties were intended to level the number of Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that the United States and the Soviet Union would retain in 
their arsenals and generally promote the intent that the two superpowers were making a 
reasonable effort to cooperate. The treaties fit the original U.S ‘nuclear Triad’ strategy. 
More important to the focus of this thesis is that the treaties generally prevented the 
United States from combining their missile defense components into an integrated 
system.  
1. SALT Treaties 
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the 
Soviet Union from 1969 to 1972 “essentially (froze), at existing levels, the number of 
strategic ballistic missile launchers, operational or under construction, on each side, and 
(permitted) an increase in SLBM launchers up to an agreed level for each party, only with 
the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older ICBMs or SLBM 
launchers.”5 The agreement known as the SALT I treaty was an interim agreement until a 
more comprehensive treaty, SALT II, could be confirmed. The SALT II parties agreed to 
a basic framework in 1974 and received initial signature in 1979. However, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 prompted the United States to withhold official 
ratification. SALT II became the de facto guidance as both parties abided by the 
limitations for over a decade.6 
2. START Treaties 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty limited the number of warheads, delivery 
vehicles, missiles, bombers, as well as imposed restrictions on training, testing and 
                                                 
5 “Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.” http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt1/index.html. 
6 “SALT II.” http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt2/index.html. 
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modernization. The break up of the Soviet Union prior to the enforcement of the treaty 
made the subject more complex. Eventually the United States, Russia, the Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus entered into the treaty.7 The U.S and Russia further agreed to the 
START II treaty in 2001 which reduced each nuclear arsenal by two-thirds as well as 
other provisions. 8 
3.  1972 ABM Treaty 
The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
on May 26, 1972. This treaty, part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 
permitted both countries to deploy two fixed, ground-based defenses of 
100 missile interceptors each. One defense could protect the national 
capital, while the second could be used to guard an intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) field. In a protocol signed July 3, 1974, the two 
sides halved the number of permitted defenses. The Soviet Union opted to 
keep its existing missile defense system around Moscow, while the United 
States eventually fielded its 100 permitted missile interceptors to protect 
an ICBM base near Grand Forks, North Dakota…. The United States shut 
down its permitted ABM defense only months after activating it in 
October 1975 because the financial costs of operating it were considered 
too high for the little protection it offered.9   
The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the 1972 ABM treaty enabled 
the development and fielding of the current Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in 
place. Described as: 
a collection of Elements and components…integrated to achieve the best 
possible performance against a full range of potential threats. Formerly, 
some of these Elements were restricted to act as independent systems. 
Once the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty…MDA was able to realize the benefits of integrating 
complementary, layered elements. 10  
                                                 
7 “Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.” http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/index.html. 
8 “ Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties.” http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/91-139.htm. 
9 “ The ABM Treaty At A Glance.” http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/abmtreaty.asp. 
10 BMDS Booklet, Missile Defense Agency 2006.  
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The BMDS “proved its worth when North Korea fired several ballistic missiles 
into the Sea of Japan …in July (2006). Right before the tests, the Bush administration 
activated the system as a precaution. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates penned a Daily Telegraph piece claiming that the defense had 
helped ‘promote stability’ by allowing U.S. leaders ‘to consider a wider, more flexible 
range of responses to a potential attack’. “ 11  In summary, the impetus to deploy the 
current iteration of the BMDS and its expected follow-on development was generated by 
the withdrawal of the 1972 treaty.  
C. TRANSFORMATION 
The Department of Defense embarked upon a series of efforts known as 
‘transformation’ at the onset of the 21st century with the goal of developing a leaner, cost-
effective, and more agile fighting force. Some of this can be traced to a previous effort 
(‘the Revolution in Military Affairs’ –RMA) as well as the realization that Cold War 
doctrines and processes were not sufficient to adequately sustain a War on Terror-focused 
fighting force. The idea of ‘jointness’ or near seamless integration between the military 
services, took a prominent position within the transformation circles. As recently as 2003 
the Naval Transformational Roadmap named the deployment of a sea-based ballistic 
missile defense capability as one of the primary efforts towards the establishment of Sea 
Shield. 12 Additionally, the roadmap declares this to be a ‘capability pillar’ that supports 
the Joint Operating Concept (JOC) in the key areas of Major Combat Operations, 
Strategic Deterrence, and Homeland Security (Table 1).  While the transformative effect 
can be called into question, there is little doubt that the forces of the foreseeable future 
will undoubtedly be far more joint-oriented than ever before.  Ballistic Missile Defense is 
configured as a system of multiple components across the military services, an indication 
that, in this warfare mission at least, the joint concept is firmly established. 
 
                                                 
11 Wade Boese. Arms Control Today. Jun 2007, Vol.37, Iss.5. Accessed via Proquest Feb 4, 2008. 
12 Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003. 
  10
 
Table 1.   Contribution of Sea Shield Transformational Initiative to Joint Operational 
Concepts (From Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003) 
1. The Joint Effect 
Greater than merely facilitating military coordination, the joint concept integrates 
doctrine, planning, and force structure as articulated in Joint Vision 2020. This concept 
may have difficulty becoming executable at more granular levels of operation, but in the 
arena of Ballistic Missile Defense it experiences a smooth translation. Using the current 
Missile Defense Agency vision for the Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System it is 
evident that this system must be a truly joint system and that the processes that enable the 
system must be joint wherever possible.  
The envisioned architecture includes elements from Command and Control (C2), 
Sensors, and Weapons with a notable emphasis and ultimate reliance on joint 
interoperability. Command and Control is achieved via Battle Management 
communications at select Component Commander levels (Strategic Command, Northern 
Command, Pacific Command, Central Command, European Command) as well as the 
National Military Command Center (NMCC). Sensors include Defense Support Program 
(DSP) satellites and Early Warning radar sites from the Air Force, Army AN/TPY-2 
phased array radar platforms and Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships. Weapons 
include the SM-3 missile launched from an Aegis ship, Army Patriot Advanced 
Capability or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles, and the Air 
Force Airborne Laser and others. 
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Figure 1.   Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System Diagram 
(From BMDS Booklet; MDA) 
D. U.S. NAVY ROLE IN BMD 
In the case of the U.S. Navy, the asset most able to deploy as part of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense system is the Aegis warship. These ships are either of the Ticonderoga 
Guided Missile Cruiser (CG) class or the Arleigh Burke Guided Missile Destroyer class 
(DDG), the difference being primarily ship/crew size. An excellent albeit unclassified 
description of Aegis can be found on the Navy’s web site:13 
The Aegis system was designed as a total weapon system, from detection 
to kill. The heart of the system is an advanced, automatic detect and track, 
multi-function phased-array radar, the AN/SPY-1. This high powered 
(four megawatt) radar is able to perform search, track and missile 
                                                 
13 “ United States Navy Fact File: Aegis Weapon  System.” 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=200&ct=2. 
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guidance functions simultaneously with a track capacity of over 100 
targets…The computer-based command and decision element is the core 
of the Aegis combat system. This interface makes the Aegis combat system 
capable of simultaneous operation against a multi-mission threat: anti-air, 
anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare. 
The Navy built the first Aegis cruisers using the hull and machinery 
designs of Spruance class destroyers. The commissioning of USS Bunker 
Hill (CG 52) opened a new era in surface warfare as the first Aegis ship 
outfitted with the Vertical Launching System (VLS), allowing greater 
missile selection, firepower and survivability. The improved AN/SPY-1B 
radar went to sea in USS Princeton (CG 59), ushering in another advance 
in Aegis capabilities. In 1980, a smaller ship was designed using an 
improved sea-keeping hull form, reduced infra-red and radar cross section 
and upgrades to the Aegis Combat System. The first ship of the DDG 51 
class, Arleigh Burke, was commissioned on the Fourth of July, 1991. 
A modification to the existing AN/SPY-1 radar allows the system to conduct 
missile search at elevations well beyond typical air search radar, thus providing the Navy 
a formidable asset in the world of ballistic missile defense. The surface fleet Type 
Commander, responsible for manning, training, and equipping the fleet, in conjunction 
with the Aegis program office and other stakeholders, created the certification 
requirements for the first set of BMD-modified ships in response to NPSD 23. The initial 
tasking was to deploy, or be ready to deploy, for Limited Defensive Operations (LDO) in 
2004. The certification requirements were modeled heavily upon the pre-existing 
requirements manuals already in place for the fleet: the Surface Force Training Manual 
(for certifications) and the Surface Force Instruction 8820 series (for Tomahawk 
qualifications). The requirements have since been modified slightly; to date there are 
seventeen ships certified to conduct Ballistic Missile Defense. In the 2008 Department of 
the Navy Objectives it is worth noting that the Chief of Naval Operation has the lead on 
‘operationalizing Theater Ballistic Missile defense naval capability.’ 14 
The Navy applies two readiness certifications to equipped Aegis units: one is 
Ballistic Missile search, the other Ballistic Missile search and engage. Three of the 
Ticonderoga-class have been modified for the engagement capability via the ability to 
                                                 
14 Department of the Navy Objectives for FY 2008 AND Beyond. 
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launch the SM-3 missile. These constitute the inventory of engagement-qualified units. 
At present, Aegis BMD presents a cost-effective means of providing a mobile capability 
that leverages the substantial investment made in the Aegis fleet. In the long term Aegis 
BMD will be able to “integrate its tracking system with ….systems such as Space-Based 
Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High) satellites, the Space Tracking and Surveillance 
System (STSS), or the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX).”15 Present day capability is 
limited to the equipped units and the C2 system employed by MDA, the specifics of 
which are beyond the scope and classification of this thesis. In general, the current Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense task is to “assist in the defense of the United States, including 
Hawaii and Alaska, by providing tracking data to cue other sensors and initiate a Ground-
Based Midcourse engagement.” 16 
 
Figure 2.   Aegis ship classes and characteristics. (Missile Defense: DefenseLink) 
E.  U.S. ARMY ROLE IN BMD 
The Army has fielded two area defense capabilities relevant to the Ballistic 
Missile Defense discussion: Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the 
Patriot system. THAAD is a land-based element with the capability to engage missiles in 
                                                 
15 Willie Brown. NPS Thesis. Analysis and Design of a Cooperative Weapon Assignment Module for 
Advanced Battle Manager of a Ballistic Missile Defense System. March 2006.   
16 BMDS Booklet, MDA.  
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or outside the atmosphere. This element has undergone extensive re-engineering and 
completed successful trails in 2006 but does not have the same operationally-fielded 
maturity as the Navy’s Aegis elements or another Army element, the Patriot system. 
THAAD shares similarities with Aegis technology in that is composed of several 
components and uses a high-resolution, multi-mode, X-band, phased array radar. The 
radar employs fence, volume, and cued search modes while providing surveillance, 
acquisition, track, discrimination, missile engagement support, and kill assessment.17 
Figures 3 and 4 provide a display of the major THAAD components.  
 
Figure 3.   THAAD Radar Components (From FM 3-01.11) 
 
 
                                                 
17 Army Field Manual 3-01.11, Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook. 
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Figure 4.   THAAD Launcher (From FM 3-10.11) 
 
The Army first fielded the Patriot missile system in the 1980s as a ground-based 
counter to Soviet air threats. As the capability matured Patriot developed into a missile 
shield entity, thus elevating it from a point defense to an area defense asset. The Patriot 
deployment in the first Gulf War against Iraq validated to a certain extent the system’s 
utility when it provided a missile shield of sorts as a counter to Iraqi SCUD missiles 
lobbed in to Israel and Saudi Arabia. This marked the first time in history that a defensive 
missile was employed to defeat an incoming enemy ballistic missile. More important at 
that time was the likely psychological effect the missile shield afforded the populace. In 
fact, Israel requested Patriot support shortly after the start of the war when reports of 
successful Patriot defense of the Saudi city of Dhahran circulated. Yet the Patriot 





Of the 90 missiles fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel, American crews 
determined that 47 were threatening and fired 158 Patriots to intercept 
them. Initial analysis showed that Patriots intercepted forty five of those 
forty seven SCUDs  for an engagement success rate of 96 percent. The 
Patriots were designed to defend point targets such as airfields and ports, 
not entire cities. They suffered mixed results in fending off the SCUD 
attacks; in many cases intercepting Patriots deflected the incoming 
SCUDs, leaving the warheads and debris to rain down on Israeli and Saudi 
cities.18 
Improvements in missile capability became the initiative for the Patriot Advanced 
Capabilities (PAC) development, which eventually materialized into the Patriot 
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).  PAC-3 added hit-to-kill accuracy within the terminal 
phase of missile flight. Patriot is the most mature component of the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System and fills the role of “short-range defense [of] vital civilian and military 
assets, defend[s] deployed troops, and provide[s] continuous air and missile defense 
coverage for rapidly maneuvering forces.” 19 
                                                 
18 Willie Brown. NPS Master’s thesis. Analysis and Design of a Cooperative Weapon Assignment 
Module for Advanced Battle Manager of a Ballistic Missile Defense System. March 2006. 
19 BMDS Booklet, MDA. 
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Figure 5.   Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Overview 
(From Missile Defense, DefenseLink)  
 
The Patriot system typically enters into theater as a Battalion, made up of four 
firing Batteries and a controlling Fire Direction Center (FDC). Like the Navys’ Aegis 
Weapon System, Patriot was designed and appropriated as a service-specific air defense 
system. The capability to participate in a theater-wide (now global) system did not 
become viable until later in the Patriot operational lifecycle.  
  18
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III. CERTIFICATION SYSTEM AND PROCESS 
Joint Vision 2020 states what the Joint Chiefs expect from the Armed Services, 
now and in the future. Interoperability is a priority and it is in this area that the discussion 
of certification properly aligns. While certification is not specifically mentioned in Joint 
Vision 2020 there is clearly an understanding that the services must have “a suitable 
focus on procedural and organizational elements…decision makers at all levels must 
understand each other’s capabilities and constraints.” 
20
Certification in a given area is a 
requirement levied by a parent service on units or activities for a variety of reasons. 
When an agency completes certification on a specific weapon system it indicates that the 
system has met a minimum agreed upon performance threshold. Similarly, when a unit 
certifies an individual on a piece of equipment it is an indication that the individual has 
demonstrated a certain level of competency in equipment operation and has, in most 
cases, completed formalized training associated with that equipment.  
Certification of a unit or crew generally has the same meaning as the previous 
examples of weapon system or individual but with a somewhat different consequence. 
When the Navy certifies a ship in Air Defense or Ballistic Missile Defense that ship 
becomes available, immediately in some cases, to deploy in support of that mission. Per 
the Surface Force Training Manual a typical ship is expected to participate in and 
complete more advanced training in Strike Group training exercises prior to a 
deployment. However, emergent mission requirements can supercede follow-on training 
and a ship can deploy as certified in Ballistic Missile Defense (for example) without the 
benefit of the advanced training that they would normally complete. This scenario is 
actually not an unlikely one if one considers the Ballistic Missile Defense mission 
deployments as conducted by the initial Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG) in 2004-2005.  
The Army certifies a Patriot Battery in a similar fashion. The Batteries conduct 
drills according to Field Manual (FM) 3-01.86, the Air Defense Artillery Patriot Brigade 
Gunnery Program, and are observed by their Battalion representatives. The Battalion then 
                                                 
20 Joint Vision 2020, “Interoperability,” 15. 
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certifies individual Batteries as ‘Table VIII certified’. This certification is not the highest 
level of certification available but rather the minimum certification level a Battery must 
complete in order to be considered deployment-ready. A typical Battalion will conduct 
follow-on training in theater to demonstrate readiness to the area Component 
Commander. The parallel between the two (Navy Aegis BMD asset and Army Patriot 
asset) is that certification applies after completion of what amounts to a unit-level 
standard of training. No upper or lower bounds are attached to the certification other than 
a periodicity. It is assumed that the unit will conduct evolutions with a broader scope to 
include joint exercises but that is not a requirement for certification and thus not a 
requirement to deploy. This accentuates the need for: (a) a rigorous and challenging unit 
self-assessment program, (b) an equally rigorous assessment system as directed by the 
certification entity, and (c) a means to accurately document the results but more 
importantly a means to document the progress of the unit. Given the state of database 
technology and data warehousing available this last requirement, or identified need, 
certainly seems manageable.   
Strategic Command established a program for the overall certification and 
qualification requirements for components within the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 
These requirements are divided by target audience in to four levels: Individual, Collective 
Unit/Crew, Staff, and Global (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.   STRATCOM Command Certification Responsibilities (From SD 508-8) 
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The directive is organized to “provide initial, periodic, non-recurring(update) 
qualifications and certification” for all levels. It provides a description of the program but 
the details of execution are left to the component (service) commands. Pacific Command 
(PACOM) can be considered a ‘Staff’ level participant in this structure. In turn PACOM 
has a process to certify a Joint task Force (JTF) via the PACOM instruction 0029.1, Joint 
Task Force Certification Program, and in the context of this particular mission area would 
include Ballistic Missile Defense as a measurable task. This is of particular relevance as 
the Ballistic Missile Defense System focus has emphasized the Pacific region and a 
predominance of assets fall within the PACOM sphere of responsibility. The criteria for 
JTF certification by the Pacific Command includes:  
• Competency in JTF Core Mission Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs) 
• Competency in assigned Mission related JMETs (BMD would be an 
example) 
• Successful completion of a USPACOM measured certification exercise 
Achievement of these and several other measures are met using three program 
pillars: a regimen of training, participation in a JTF command post exercise, and the 
assessment of JTF performance.  The training and exercise observation role is staffed by 
Standing Joint Force Headquarters Pacific, personnel from the Joint Warfighting Center 
(JWFC) or specialists contracted for support. The illustrated program flow in Figure (7) 
captures the PACOM methodology for certification.21 
                                                 
21 USPACOMINST 0029.1, 1 February 2006. 
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Figure 7.   Generic Joint Task Force Certification Process  
(From USPACOMINST 0029.1) 
The next logical tier of certification in the STRATCOM tier is the unit or crew 
actually engaged in a Ballistic Missile Defense mission. The two elements that will be 
examined are from the Navy’s Aegis community and the Army’s Patriot community. 
A. NAVY UNITS 
Naval forces included 279 active ships available for tasking in a variety of 
mission areas. The Naval mission has evolved from coastal patrol and convoy protection 
in to power protection and force defense. Power projection has been the role of the 
aircraft carrier and amphibious assault fleet for most of the post World War II-era Navy. 
More recently the ‘small boys’, destroyers and cruisers, have played a part in power 
projection with the addition of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM). The 
cruiser/destroyer fleet also carried, and continuesto carry, the bulk of the force defense  
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missions. With the advent of advanced radar technology these units are now equipped to 
project force defense capability in to a much larger area as part of the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System. 
1. AEGIS PLATFORMS 
The first Aegis ship, the USS Ticonderoga, was commissioned in 1983. At 
present there are over seventy Aegis ships commissioned in the U.S. Navy. Nations that 
have made an investment in the weapon system include Japan (six ships from the Atago 
or Kongo class), the Republic of Korea (one King Sejong class), Norway(five Fridtjof 
Nansen class, Spain (five Alvaro de Bazan class) and Australia(purchased three for the 
upcoming Hobart class). 22 This list is not meant to imply that those nations have the 
capability to employ their Aegis suite in a Ballistic Missile Defense role. Aegis is a 
complete system that incorporates fast reaction time in an Air Defense environment but 
also supports many other mission areas. The Aegis Weapon System (AWS) onboard 
includes the following components: 
• SPY-1 radar for target search and track 
• Weapons Control System (WCS) for engagement management 
• Fire Control System (FCS) for terminal guidance 
• Vertical Launch System (VLS) for missile storage and launch 
• Standard Missile (SM) variants for hard kill capability 
• Operational Readiness Test System (ORTS) for diagnostics 








                                                 
22 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aegis_weapon_system#Aegis_in_other_navies. 
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Aegis supports the need for a flexible response to many of the theaters that the 
United States is interested in. The Pacific Fleet deployed the initial set of Ballistic Missile 
Defense certified units in 2004; this ‘Limited Defensive Operation’ was intended to field 
the system in the Sea of Japan as a means to provide some BMD capability to the area 
commander in the event off North Korean activity. The Navy routinely deploys entire 
Strike Groups to the Arabian Gulf; each Strike Group has at least one Aegis unit organic 
to it and in some cases three or more. As the Navy certifies more BMD assets, these ships 
will provide Component Commanders a maritime-based, theater missile defense 
capability as well as a component within the overall Global Missile Defense System.   
a. Guided Missile Cruisers 
There are twenty-two Ticonderoga class Cruisers in commission as of 
2008 and no plans to build any more. Three of the twenty-two have had the upgrade for 
the Ballistic Missile Defense mission and have been certified to conduct. The Navy has 
committed to extend the life cycle of many of these warships via ‘Cruiser Conversion’, a 
modernization plan that will update many onboard components including the Aegis 
Weapon System. Cruisers are “multi-mission (Air Warfare, Undersea Warfare, Naval 
Surface Fire Support and Surface Warfare) surface combatants capable of supporting 
carrier battle groups, amphibious forces, or of operating independently and as flagships of 
surface action groups.”23 Prior to deploying a typical Cruiser must certify in twenty 
separate mission areas.  
A Cruiser is considered a Major Command, on par with a Destroyer 
Squadron in the surface community, and is therefore an O-6 (Navy Captain) command. 
Accordingly, many Cruisers also deploy as the primary Maritime Air Defense 
Commander in a Strike Group, responsible for the air defense coordination of a given 
area around the Strike Group. There are also occasions when a Cruiser is assigned other 
Warfare Commander (Surface Warfare, Undersea Warfare) duties in a primary role.  
                                                 
23 “The U.S. Navy: Our Ships.” http://www.navy.mil/navydata. 
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b. Guided Missile Destroyers 
There are 57 Arleigh Burke class Destroyers in commission as of 2008 
and at least four more have funds appropriated for construction. These Destroyers fulfill 
numerous roles within the current surface force. Their decreased draft allows for a more 
littoral presence than the Ticonderoga class ships. Note that they also are very much a 
multi-mission platform and deploy much like a Cruiser. A typical Destroyer must certify 
in twenty separate mission areas. Fourteen destroyers have been outfitted for the Ballistic 
Missile Defense mission to date and are certified to conduct.  
Destroyers are commanded at the O-5 (Navy Commander) level. It is not 
the norm for a given Strike Group to utilize a Destroyer as a primary Warfare 
Commander.  
B. TYPE COMMANDER CERTIFICATION 
The Navy can basically be divided in to two regions, Pacific and Atlantic 
(PACFLT, LANTFLT). A ‘Type Commander’ is associated with each force category to 
include Surface Forces, Air Forces and Submarine Forces to name the more influential 
Type Commanders. The Type Commanders are responsible for the training, readiness 
and manning their force structure so as to provide Operational level commanders 
resources for missions. In the arena of Ballistic Missile Defense the cognizant Type 
Commander is Commander, Naval Surface Forces (SURFOR). SURFOR “equips its 
forces with the necessary training, tools, maintenance and material to successfully 
accomplish their mission—across the entire spectrum of warfare operations.”24 An 
influential mechanism to accomplish that task is via the Type Commander certification 
process. Succinctly, the Type Commander sets forth minimum certification requirements 
in every pertinent warfare area per specific ship class. These requirements are defined in 
the Surface Force Training Manual (SFTM).  
                                                 
24 “CNSP Mission Statement.”http://www.surfpac.navy.mil/site%20pages/mission.aspx. 
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1. Surface Force Training Manual 
The Surface Force Training Manual provides the framework for meeting the 
stated requirement of continuous readiness. Continuous readiness is maintained by 
adhering to the requirements of the SFTM throughout a given ships’ operational 
schedule. A typical employment schedule includes a Unit Level phase, a Surge Ready 
phase, Sustainment, Deployment, and post-Deployment periods. The certification 
requirements are typically met and demonstrated during the Unit Level phase. A critical 
idea expressed in the SFTM is that ship crews must demonstrate the ability to train 
themselves in addition to meeting the certification requirements. “The goal of Unit Level 
Phase training is that the ship’s training teams be able to effectively train and assess 
themselves and the ship to be certified in those ….primary mission areas.”25 The Fleet 
Response Training Plan (FRTP) encompasses the major readiness phases and is designed 
to develop and maintain Strike Group proficiency. Per the SFTM, the ability of a ship to 
maintain continuous readiness, as specifically defined by warfare area within the 
document, is the ‘key enabler’ for FRTP functionality.  
 
Figure 8.   Fleet Response Training Plan (From CNSFINST 3502.1C) 
The Surface Force Type Commander employs two ‘enabling data engines’ in the 
form of Training and Operational Readiness Information Service (TORIS) and Training 
Figure of Merit (TFOM) to report ship progress, capture data, compare ship class trends, 
and achieve training and certification process efficiency. TORIS is the ‘single 
authoritative database/hub for all proficiency efficiency metrics….(it is) a web-based 
data-engine, consisting of various applications used to assess, train and certify ships.’ 
                                                 
25 Surface Force Training Manual. 
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TFOM is used as a lens that displays current status of a given mission area. It is based on 
four generic areas of a mission area: the ‘pillars’ of Proficiency, Personnel, Management, 
and Material. These pillars are the basis for the Continuous Certification Requirements 
(CCRs), those things that a crew must meet and demonstrate enroute to certification. 
Conceptually, TORIS is the holder of all pertinent data points associated with a mission 
area and TFOM is the progress report on that mission area. This information is valuable 
to the crew attempting to certify but also proves valuable for decision makers up the 
chain of command when analyzing readiness trends, best practices, and validating 
requirements.  
The following describes the Continuous Certification Requirements employed by 
the Surface Force commander to assess and certify ships in Ballistic Missile Defense per 











Figure 9.   Tab U; CG and DDG BMD Certification Requirements 
(From CNSFINST 3502.1C) 
The Type Commanders’ Executive Agent for conducting training and 
assessments, the Afloat Training Group (ATG), works with the appropriate scheduling 
agencies to allot training periods for each ship. A concerted effort has been made to 
streamline the process by providing the bulk of re-certifications to occur around the same 
time (per ship) and by putting the onus on the ship to maintain the Continuous 
Certification Requirements. This is intended to have the effect of freeing up more 
availability time so that ships can meet operational tasking.  
a. Continuous Certification Requirements 
As illustrated in Figure (9) the requirements are divided in to four basic 







Proficiency is measured by assessing the ships’ Training Teams ability to 
train itself as well as their ability to train the various positions up to a defined standard 
(defined by objective criteria in TORIS). The vehicle to accomplish this is via   a series of 
increasingly complex training scenarios. Additionally, select individuals must 
demonstrate proficiency in utilizing the Joint Tactical Terminal to receive electronic 
intelligence via the Integrated Broadcast Service for cuing.  
Personnel requirements include a fully qualified training team, fully 
qualified watch teams, and the ship must have graduates from at least 80% of the required 
schools that pertain to Ballistic Missile Defense. Fully qualified in this case means all 
members of a given team are qualified in the station that they are manning or assessing. 
The school requirements are defined by warfare area in a comprehensive decision support 
system for management at all echelons known as Navy Training Master Planning System 
(NTMPS).  
Management requirements are met by meeting three criteria: the current 
Commanding Officer must have signed in to effect his/her Battle Orders, the ship must 
have a comprehensive replacement plan documented for the upcoming year, and the ship 
must have documented their status on Afloat Self-Assessment sheets as provided by the 
Afloat Training Groups.  
Finally, in the Material section the ship must demonstrate equipment 
readiness by completing, or recently completed, a system operability test and utilizing 
embedded training devices where applicable. This last requirement is not yet as mature in 
Ballistic Missile Defense as it is in other warfare areas but there has been an effort within 
the training communities to provide a robust training product to the ships.  
All of the above requirements are demonstrated to, and validated by, the 
Type Commanders’ executive agent in this arena, the Afloat Training Groups (ATG), 
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collectively known as the Afloat Training Organization. Additionally, the immediate 
operational commander of the ship (or ISIC, Immediate Superior in Charge) will have a 
staff representative onboard for on-site verification as well. Upon certification a ship will 
typically conduct a follow-on, certification-like training event a few months later to 
ensure that the crew is in fact sustaining those skills demonstrated and that the 
Continuous Certification Requirements are to date.   
b. TORIS Data and NMETL Relationship 
The specific events demonstrated by a ship, and captured as a data point in 
TORIS, are the granular components of the overarching Universal Naval Task List 
(UNTL).  This Task List is a common reference for commanders at the joint level for the 
reporting of joint training and readiness. The tasks are used to document war fighting 
requirements as ‘Mission Essential Tasks’ (METs). In turn the UNTL is linked to the 
Universal Joint Task List (UJTL); in all, both of these lists exist for the ‘planning, 
conducting, assessing and evaluating joint and Service training’26. The overall UNTL 
decomposes in to various stages of granularity but it is critical to note that the most 
detailed level pertaining to specific mission accomplishment ends with the Naval Mission 
Essential Task List (NMETL). By definition, development of the Naval Tasks was 
conducted using the following guidelines: 
• Tasks describe an activity outside the command 
• Tasks describe a discrete event 
• Tasks do not define who 
• Tasks do not define how 
• Tasks do not discuss a specific piece of equipment 
• Tasks do not describe environmental issues 
• Tasks do not duplicate an existing task 
Further, tasks do not specify means (type of unit, system, etc.) and do not 
include conditions. The focus is strictly on activities performed. There is an established 
standard for each task, described as the ‘minimum acceptable proficiency required’ in the 
                                                 
26 Universal Naval Task List; OPNAVINST 3500.38B/MCO3500.26/USCG COMDTINST 3500.1B. 
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demonstration of task performance. Figure (10) illustrates a task linked to missile defense 
with an associated criterion for assessment: 
 
Figure 10.   BMD-related Naval Task (From OPNAVINST 3500.38B) 
Based on the above criteria a given task is not attributable to a specific 
crew, team or individual. The system employed by the agents of the Surface Force Type 
Commander provides a much greater degree of detail so that, at the unit level, 
commanders can assess a given crew. Appendix A is a list of data points captured by the 
assessment team during Ballistic Missile Defense certification.  
The Navy employs a Web-based SIPRNET client known as Navy Training 
Information Management System (NTIMS) to ‘build, store, and apply NMETLS…and 
training resource and requirement models’. The developers of TORIS and TFOM are 
working towards a fully automated data feed to transfer the granular training information 
within their system to NTIMS via Extensible Markup Language (XML) Web Services.27 
c.  8820.2 Series 
In addition to the Training Manual instruction the Surface Force Type 
Commander also has a separate instruction pertinent to the Ballistic Missile Defense 
mission. The SURFOR Instruction 8820.2 series, Ballistic Missile Defense Long Range 
Surveillance and Track (LRS&T)/Engagement Qualification/Certification Program, 
specifies “procedures for certification and tactical qualification” of Aegis ships 
                                                 
27 ATG Brief, Training Summit.  
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possessing the BMD upgrade. 28 In general, the tactical qualification requirements in the 
8820 parallel the tasks in Tab U proficiency measures of the SFTM. The 8820 also levies 
a Material and Safety certification on the ship. In fact, most of the instruction is devoted 
to the specifics of the Material/Safety aspect.  Chronologically, the 8820.2 series was 
released to the fleet coincident with the initial Aegis BMD installations, before a BMD 
Tab had been added to the Training Manual instruction.  
d. SORTS 
The traditional means by which any Navy unit reports status per mission 
area is via the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). There is very nearly a 
one to one parallel in the ‘Mission Areas’ in SORTS to the warfare certifications a ship 
meets in the Surface Force Training Manual. One drawback to SORTS is that it captures 
deficiencies but not necessarily proficiencies and that it is a snapshot of that units’ 
readiness at a moment in time. That readiness is assigned from one to five states (M1 
through M5) and there is no mechanism available to the commander to compare the true 
readiness level between two or more ships reporting like states (M1 for instance). The 
Training Figure of Merit system allows the commander to ‘drill down’ and view specific 
areas of increasing or declining proficiency onboard a given ship. 
2.  Sustainment Training 
As stated in the Surface Force Training Manual, ships are intended to complete 
‘unit level’ training coincident with their appropriate certifications and move on to 
intermediate or advanced phases. This involves various live and synthetic exercises with 
their assigned Strike Group.  The Numbered Fleet Commanders (Third, Seventh and 
Second Fleets respectively in this case) are responsible for this level of training. The 
Ballistic Missile Defense Exercise (BMDEX) is the vehicle to accomplish Sustainment 
training for units or Strike Groups. The BMDEX utilizes a ship’s embedded training  
 
 
                                                 
28 CNSFINST 8820.2. 
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capability, a portable training device or a distributed training scenario employing various 
degrees of fidelity. This exercise is a quarterly requirement for units and is part of the 
Training Figure of Merit calculation.  
C. AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY 
The Army has had a Regiment Artillery in service since 1776. The Air Defense 
Artillery was established as a branch of the Army in 1968 although air defense regiments 
were constituted during World War II for combat support. These commands evolved in to 
iterations of the Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). The AAMDC is 
“the Army’s combat organization for planning, coordinating, integrating, and executing 
(missile defense) operations.”29Air Defense Artillery is not exclusive to the Patriot 
community as other Battalions also report to an ADA Brigade (the Avenger community 
for example).  A Patriot Battery is just one component within the Army’s Air and Missile 
Defense Command construct. A condensed chain of command hierarchy starts with a 
Battery platoon to a Patriot Battalion and then ends (for the sake of this discussion) with 
an Air Defense Artillery Brigade.   
1. Patriot  
The combat element of the Patriot weapon system is the Firing Battery (FB). The 
system will normally fight as a Battalion with a complement of four batteries and a Fire 
Direction Center (FDC) for localized command and control. The Firing Battery (FB) of 
the Patriot weapons system includes the following major components (Figure 11): 
                                                 
29 FM 100-12, Army Theater Missile Defense Operation. 
  35
 
Figure 11.   Patriot Firing Unit Components (From FM 3-01.11) 
• Radar Set (RS), a phased array multi-function radar for search and track 
• Engagement Control Station (ECS) for operational control of the Battery 
• Launching Station (LS) transports and launches the missiles 
• Antenna Mast Group (AMG) provides antenna and amplifier systems for 
communications 
• Electrical Power Unit (EPU) or Plant (EPP) provides primary power 
• The Battery Command Post (BCP) is the weapon system interface to other 
information systems 
• The Guided Missile (GM) includes the canister which also functions as 
launch tube and shipping/storage container 
The Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB) exercises control 
over the Batteries via the Information and Coordination Central (ICC), a vehicle that is 
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equipped with track management, communications, and command and control capability. 
A Battalion is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel (LTC), an O-5 with an Air Defense 
background.  
At present, there are thirteen active Patriot Battalions in the Air Defense Artillery 
community. The weapon system has seen considerable service in Operations Desert 
Storm and Iraqi Freedom but has also been deployed to the Korean peninsula and to the 
European theater in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization exercises. Table (2) 
summarizes the U.S. Army Patriot battalions and the Brigade they report to.  
Battalion Base Brigade Commander 
2d BN, 43d ADA CENTCOM 11th BDE 
1st BN, 43d ADA FT Bliss, TX 11th BDE 
3d BN, 43d ADA FT Bliss, TX 11th BDE 
5th BN, 52d ADA FT Bliss, TX 11th BDE 
6th BN, 52d ADA FT Sill, OK 31st BDE 
3d BN, 2d ADA Osan AFB, ROK 35th BDE 
1st BN, 44th ADA Osan AFB, ROK 35th BDE 
2d BN, 1st ADA FT Hood, TX 69th BDE 
4th BN, 5th ADA FT Hood, TX 69th BDE 
1st BN, 7th ADA FT Bragg, NC 108th BDE 
3d BN, 4th ADA FT Bragg, NC 108th BDE 
1st BN, 1st ADA Kadena AFB, Okinawa 94th AAMDC 
5th BN, 7th ADA Rhine Barracks, GE 357th AMD-D 
Table 2.   U.S. Army Patriot Battalions 
 
Other nations that have made an investment in the Patriot weapon system include 
Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel, Greece, Taiwan, and the Netherlands.30  
The Army and the Missile Defense Agency are integrating the advanced capability 
version of Patriot with the developing Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), 
a cooperative venture between the United States, Italy and Germany to develop a mobile 
system that is netted and distributed.  
                                                 
30 “Patriot Missile System.” http://www.espionageinfo.com/Pa-Po/Patriot-Missile-System.html. 
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a.  PAC-3 
The modifications to upgrade the Patriot weapon system were acquired in 
a series of configurations with the generic title of Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3). 
The PAC-3 Configuration 1 addition in 1995 upgraded the Engagement Control Station 
and Information Coordination Central, added a pulse Doppler processor for radar 
performance enhancement, and included embedded data-recording equipment. One year 
later the PAC-3 Configuration 2 added the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
(JTIDS) for data exchange with joint forces and software upgrades that improved radar 
performance, system detection, identification, and engagement. The PAC-3 
Configuration 3 added a program that “significantly improved radar range performance to 
discriminate and identify a tactical ballistic missile warhead from other target debris or 
objects.” In 2001 the delivery of a lethality enhancer in the form of hit-to-kill technology 
made the Patriot PAC-3 missile a significant element in the lower tier BMD 
architecture.31 
Figure 12.   Patriot Configuration Evolution (From www.raytheon.com) 
                                                 
31 “Raytheon Company Patriot Products.”www.raytheon.com/products/patriot. 
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D.  BRIGADE CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 
The certification of Patriot Batteries and Battalions is conducted under the 
guidance of Army Field Manual 3-01.86, the Air Defense Artillery Patriot Brigade 
Gunnery Program. The proponent of the program is the Army Air Defense Artillery 
School (AADASCH) under the overall auspices of the Army Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC). TRADOC supports unit training, develops doctrine, establishes 
standards in addition to the recruitment and training of soldiers. 32 
The program is based on a series of gunnery tables outlined in FM 3-01.86 and 
applies a frequency requirement to each certification level. Decertification criteria are 
also detailed in the Field Manual. It is designed to develop and then test the proficiency 
of the individual, crew, and Battery in a sequential, performance-oriented training 
environment.  
1.  FM 3-01.86 
The purpose of the gunnery tables is to “train individuals to perform as crew 
members” 33 at the Basic level. Following successful completion of the Basic Gunnery 
Tables, I through IV, individuals receive a Basic certification as a qualified crew 
member. This is achieved via hands-in training, individual instruction and successful 
completion of practical and written exercises. The initial qualification must be achieved 
within ninety days of reporting to the unit. Evaluation is conducted at the Battery level 
with the examinations typically administered by the Brigade Electronic Missile 
Maintenance Officer (EMMO).  
The Intermediate and Advanced Gunnery Tables, also included in FM 3-01.86, 
are the responsibility of the parent Brigade. It is typical for the Brigade to employ 
evaluators from sister Battalions, when available, for evaluation of the various crew 
stations. The actual certification events are Table VIII and Table XII. The gunnery tables 
                                                 
32 “About TRADOC.”http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm. 
33 FM 3-01.86. 
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preceding are preparatory exercises that the Batteries (and/or Battalions) train to prior to 
requesting the graded certification event (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.   Patriot Gunnery Tables (From FM 3-01.86) 
a. Table VIII 
A Table VIII certification is an Intermediate certification used to train 
Patriot crews “to march order, emplace, initialize, and conduct air battle operations in a 
‘Battery Collective Environment’ during daylight hours in varying NBC 
environments.”34 It is typically conducted in conjunction with a Field Training Exercise 
(FTX).  Crews are required to be Table VIII certified within 180 days of arrival to the 
unit and once every 180 days thereafter until the Advanced Gunnery Table certification is 
achieved. The scenarios used to accomplish the crew and Battery tables are categorized 
as basic, intermediate or advanced and are part of a library of tailorable scenarios titled 
Reticle Aim Levels (RAL) one through 17. Intermediate RALs, six through eleven, are 
45 to 60 minutes in duration, with minimum raid sizes, hostile air tracks, Theater Ballistic 
Missile raids, and equipment casualties. There are also timed requirements for a system 
march, emplacement and re-join. Crews ‘train up’ to the Table VIII certification by 
utilizing a RAL 10 scenario, which also includes a Battalion ‘netted’, or shared, scenario 
for track exchange with other units and the ICC.  
                                                 
34 FM 3-01.86. 
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A Patriot Firing Unit is required to maintain the following minimum crew 
levels for the Intermediate or Advanced Gunnery Table: 
• Two Engagement Control Station (ECS) crews 
• One Radar Set (RS) crew 
• One Electrical Power Plant (EPP) crew 
• One Antenna Mast Group (AMG) crew 
• One Command Post (CP) crew 
• One RSOP(reconnaissance) team 
• Five Launcher crews 
• Two Guided Missile Transport(GMT)/Forklift Missile reload teams 
Additionally, the Battalion Headquarters Batteries must maintain: 
• Two Information and Coordination Central (ICC) crews 
• One AMG crew 
• Two Communications Relay Group (CRG) crews 
• One RSOP team 
De-certification will result from a failure to meet the minimum crew 
certifications described above and/or if an equipment crew fails an evaluation.  
b. Table XII 
A Table XII certification is an Advanced Gunnery Table certification 
conducted during night hours but with much of the same criteria as a Table VIII. 
Battalions utilize the more advanced RAL scenarios (11-17) for these events. A Table XII 
certification is annual crew requirement. The Table VIII minimum crew levels also apply 
to the Advanced certification.  
c. Universal Task List 
The Army Universal Task List provides a “standard, doctrinal foundation 
and catalogue of the Army’s tactical collective tasks” 35 that apply to the tactical level of 
war.  It articulates the Army task but does not describe what constitutes success. It does 
                                                 
35 FM 7-15. 
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provide measures of performance for use in development of task standards. A complete 
mission statement from the assessing authority is used to specify type of unit for task 
accomplishment and when/how the task will be performed.  Army Task 4.0 (ART 4.0) 
describes the battle operating system in Air Defense, to include force protection from 
ballistic missiles.  
 
Figure 14.   Air Defense Task(From FM 7-15) 
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Figure 15.   Air Defense sub-tasks(From FM 7-15) 
Progressing from the universal task to the more specific task, in this case 
involving the conduct of engagements (Figure 15), the Task List provides the 
performance measure and the scale for measurement. Scale in this instance is binary 
(Yes/No) or quantifiable (time, percentage). Table (3) refers: 
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ART 4.3.3 Conduct Engagements Using Air Defense Weapon System 
No. Scale Measure 
1 Yes/No 
Friendly course of action must change as a result of enemy air 
attack. 
2 Yes/No 
Were air defense weapons used in accordance with established 
rules of engagement? 
3 Time 
To warn dedicated air defense units after indication of inbound 
enemy aerial platforms. 
4 Time 
For air defense weapon system to acquire, track, and engage as 
necessary a specific aerial platform once assigned responsibility 
for the engagement of that specific aerial platform. 
5 Time To determine weapons control status. 
6 Time 
For air defense weapon system to recycle/reload so that it Is 
capable of engaging another aerial platform. 
7 Percent 
Of enemy aerial platforms able to penetrate air defense network 
to deliver ordnance/accomplish mission. 
8 Percent 
Of all air defense systems positioned to engage the enemy aerial 
platform. 
9 Percent 
Of friendly courses of action that must be changed because of 
enemy attack. 
10 Percent 
Of enemy aerial platforms engaged that are destroyed by each 
air defense weapon system. 
11 Percent Of friendly casualties attributed to enemy aerial platforms. 
12 Percent 
Of enemy engaged aerial platforms deterred from delivering their 
ordnance on target. 
13 Percent 
Of available air defense systems directed against declared 
hostile aerial platforms. 
14 Number 
Of destroyed enemy aerial platforms by air defense weapon 
system.  
Table 3.   Air Defense Engagement Task Measures 
 
Commanders utilize this Task List to develop the Mission Essential Task 
List (METL) applicable to their unit and mission. The Gunnery Tables in FM 3-01.86 
serve as the decomposition of specific METL sub-tasks to a more granular level.  
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2.  Proficiency Training 
The Patriot community uses institutional and embedded training devices to 
develop and maintain proficiency for tasks and sub-tasks. The Patriot Conduct of Fire 
Trainer (PCOFT) is a computer-driven device that runs Patriot tactical software for 
console reproductions of the ECS and ICC. The Embedded Trainers (ET) are “troop 
proficiency trainers with software programs that are built in to the tactical system and 
provide training in simulated AD battle scenarios…(crew members) receive sustainment 
training and collective training.” 36 Other devices are used for maintenance instruction, 













                                                 
36 FM 3-01.11. 
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IV. CORPORATE MEMORY 
The challenges faced by units and organizations in the missile defense arena are 
similar to challenges posed to organizations in the business arena. There are two 
fundamental issues that align closely with both examples. There is a need to measure an 
output a need to capture those measurements. Chapter III described the certification 
process in terms of what was being measured. Typically the measurement was the result 
of some discrete event pertaining to a missile defense exercise. This chapter will examine 
the methodology used to capture that measurement.  
It would be faulty to assume that because two units certify using the same process 
that they are in fact inter-changeable. The truth is that they are equally certified, and 
therefore equally ‘ready’ in an official sense for reporting purposes. However, it is very 
likely that one unit is in fact more ‘ready’ based on the strengths of individuals within 
that unit. A plausible scenario in one example assumes a unit that has a fire control 
maintainer who has deployed with four years experience is probably more ready, at that 
position at least, than a unit with a first deployment maintainer with less than a year of 
experience.  
The above example suggests that the current system employed in the certification 
process should have the ability to measure and store granular information about 
individual performance within the crew. It does not suggest that a unit in the above 
example should not achieve certification based on crew turnover. Turnover is inevitable 
and presents an opportunity to train and advance newer personnel as well as a unit 
opportunity to advance the processes, systems and approaches embedded within that 
units’ corporate memory. Therefore, the management of intangible assets such as 
knowledge can add to a more robust understanding and indication of true readiness. 
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A.  KNOWLEDGE AS AN ASSET 
Corporate memory can loosely be defined as “the body of data, information and 
knowledge relevant to an individual organization’s existence.”37 This definition may give 
a false indication that data, information and knowledge are synonymous. Knowledge 
tends to have various definitions or descriptions, including the following examples38: 
• Knowledge is organized information applicable to problem solving 
• Knowledge is information that has been organized and analyzed to make it 
understandable and applicable to problem solving or decision making 
• Knowledge is reasoning about information and data to actively enable 
performance, problem-solving, decision-making, learning and teaching 
Corporate memory and, by extension, organizational knowledge can also be 
defined using similar language.  
• Organizational knowledge is the collective sum of human-centered assets, 
intellectual property, infrastructure assets, and market assets. 
• Organizational knowledge is processed information embedded in routines 
and processes that enable action. 
Much research has been done in the area of knowledge management. For the 
purposes of this study the focus is to highlight that organizational knowledge has value. 
This value is more difficult to quantify when compared to hardware but is as important 
and thus needs to be preserved so that the organization can continue to derive benefit 
from it. The missile defense community is relatively new when viewed as a Joint group; 
whatever knowledge resident within the community can be of extreme importance and 
requires not only preservation but also analysis. This very much applies down to the unit 
level where the bulk of the actual work of missile defense is conducted.  
B.  PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
There are many approaches regarding how to measure performance. 
Organizations must employ some form of internal and/or external process measurement 
                                                 
37 “Organizational memory.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organizational_memory. 
38 Jay Liebowitz. Knowledge Management Handbook. “ The Current State of Knowledge 
Management.” 
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method in order to remain competitive. In 1995 the Department of Energy published a 
performance-based handbook titled “How to Measure Performance: A Handbook of 
Techniques and Tools.”  This handbook has generic examples of different methods that 
can be used as a starting point before examining the processes used by the two 
communities in question. The one example that best aligns with the military processes 
was designed by the Department of Energy Nevada Family Quality Forum, labeled 
simply the Performance Measurement Process. This process involves producers, 
customers, feedback mechanisms, and output measurement. Figure 16 illustrates a high 
level view of the overall process. 
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Figure 16.   Performance Measurement Process Diagram 
(from Dept of Energy handbook) 
Note that the data collected during this process is maintained in a generic 
database. This process does not necessarily indicate that data is captured through all 
phases, although one can infer that as a possibility. We can use this model as a generic 
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template for measuring a performance and assume that an organization captures, formats, 
and stores the data in a database or data warehouse for future analysis.  
1. Maturity Model 
Another tool that aids in analyzing a process and the data output of that process 
comes form the world of software development. The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) 
developed a methodology called the Capability Maturity Model (CMM), now known as 
the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI), to assess a contractors’ process for 
software development. In addition to software, the Capability Maturity Model has also 
been used to understand the process maturity of organizations in many other diverse areas 
as well. The model assigns a five level framework to describe the process of a given 
organization. For instance, a Level 1 organization has no repeatable processes in place 
and the output is based on the competencies of an assigned team or individuals. A Level 
2 organization has some repeatable processes in place to track issues such as cost, 
schedules and functionality. The model peaks with a Level 5 organization that is 
improving their processes on a continuous basis. An overview of the Capability Maturity 
Model is illustrated in Figure (17).  
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Figure 17.   Capability Maturity Model Overview 
(Software Process Improvement: Concepts and Practices. E. McGuire, Idea Group 
Publishing) 
This model provides decision makers a methodology for reviewing the business 
processes of their organization in an unbiased manner. Many organizations claim to strive 
for continual process improvement but the reality may suggest otherwise upon analysis. 
One can also use this model as a means for reviewing output consistency from the 
process. While not explicitly stated in the CMM it is implied that the organization retains 
their various business processes and outputs in a construct of some sort. The larger point 
for discussion can be made in that we can examine any business process using the 
Department of Energy example and classify it using the Capability Maturity Model but in 
any event it is universally understood that for an organization to remain competitive it 
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must adhere to the ancient guidance of the Oracle of Delphi: Know Thyself. 39Stated in 
modern terms, an organization must understand its own processes and outputs. In order to 
accomplish that this organization must be able to re-constitute records(data) of the actions 
taken during these processes.   
The Maturity Model obviously has more utility than just a software development 
rating. It can be used as a means to examine any business process within an organization. 
This is particularly valuable for military training commands in that their processes are 
very repeatable and measurements can be taken at various intervals. The following will 
describe the overall system used by the two military communities in question.  
C. SURFACE FLEET APPROACH 
The Navy’s surface forces adopted a system, the Training and Operational 
Readiness Information Services (TORIS), which contained all of the requirements a 
given ship would need to fulfill to certify in specific mission areas. This feeds another 
system, Training Figure of Merit (TFOM), so that managers at a macro level can monitor 
the progress and readiness level of that ship. The ship and her training partners, i.e. the 
certifying agency, input the information near real time so that the status is as up to date as 
possible.   
1.  TORIS 
The implementation of TORIS served to remedy two compelling problems40: 
• The amount of manpower required to capture and manipulate assessment 
data. 
• The need to transform operational observations in to usable, digitized forms. 
This program started as a pilot project to as a proof of concept for an essential set 
of tools needed by ‘readiness managers’ in the Navy. The Naval Surface Forces currently 
utilize TORIS and TFOM as a means to assist and document certification in multiple 
warfare areas. TORIS is“a database in which training requirements are kept, ship training 
                                                 
39 “Know Thyself.”http://www.philipcoppens.com/delphi.html. 
40 Opportunity Analysis for TORIS: ATGPAC. 
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events results are kept, and a source for standard, tailorable drill cards.”41 The intent is 
that TORIS will house all training tasks, whether certification-related or not. Figure (18) 
illustrates the TORIS enterprise system. 
 
Figure 18.   TORIS Enterprise View (From SFTM) 
TFOM is “a readiness indicator…used by the ship to determine where to focus 
training efforts to maintain continuous readiness.”42 It is based on four ‘pillars’, or 
specified areas of organization, with each pillar having data points associated with it. 
These pillars are: Proficiency, Personnel, Management, and Material.  The data points are 
weighed and fed into the figure of merit associated with that pillar. The pillar feeds in to 
the overall TFOM equation that translates in to a stoplight-based rating of green through 
red. Many of the data points that feed the TFOM equation(s) are ‘rolled up’ from TORIS, 
particularly in the Proficiency pillar. There is a Surface Warfare Development Group 
(SWDG) effort to expand the boundaries of TFOM outside the‘ unit level’ in to the larger 
                                                 
41 Commander, Naval Surface Forces Instruction 3502 Rev. C; Surface Force Training Manual 
(SFTM). 
42 Commander, Naval Surface Forces Instruction 3502 Rev. C; Surface Force Training Manual 
(SFTM). 
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context of strike group and fleet operations via ‘Tactical TFOM’. Information regarding 
Tactical TFOM is only available at present on classified networks and thus is outside the 
scope of this project. Figure (19) illustrates the TFOM Hierarchy. 
 
Figure 19.   TFOM Hierarchy (From SFTM) 
An analysis conducted prior to TORIS development identified existing issues with 
the former Surface Navy approach as it existed at that time. Notable issues that may 
pertain to the Patriot community include: 
• The process for documenting/reporting/warehousing (assessment) data is 
manual and labor intensive 
• Manual data entry not supportive of higher degrees of data analysis 
• Difficulty in maintaining standardization across the various assessment 
locations and commands 
• No mechanism available for data sharing between authoritative sources 
The TORIS project instituted three tools that facilitated the management of 
readiness information: a portable system for data capture, a central web system, and a 
data sharing mechanism. The portable data system enabled efficient capture and transfer 
of data points observed during assessments to the central system. The central system 
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included web-centric applications to receive, store, manipulate and display data and 
readiness information. Data sharing was achieved with server software that responded to 
queries from external(to the assessing agency) data consumers in a machine-to-machine 
format. All of this by necessity was compliant with Navy Information Technology 
directives.  
The data points captured in TORIS and TFOM are directly related to certification 
requirements from the Surface Force Training Manual. Most of the events conducted by a 
ship during a Ballistic Missile Defense training event or assessment fall under the 
Proficiency pillar. The resulting data is used by the readiness managers in the fleet 
hierarchy to determine performance and training trends among other issues. Unlike the 
Status of Readiness and Training System (SORTS), the data within TORIS and TFOM is 
unclassified. The SORTS database provides the fleet decision-makers a more holistic 
view of a given ship but also a more generic view as well. It may indicate that a ship is 
degraded in a mission area due to non-completion of an exercise but it does not indicate 
how well the ship has done in past exercises and to what degree.  
Clearly, the Naval Surface Forces approach to certification is compatible with the 
Strategic Command Directive for missile defense participants. Additionally, this 
certification process and data collection methodology facilitates process improvement in 
that the data is collected and maintained in a format that is usable. 
D.  AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY APPROACH 
The Army’s process is governed by Field Manual 3-01.86 and all of the 
requirements are followed via check sheets from that publication.  The assessors of a 
Patriot Battery are personnel from the next echelon up within that Battery’s chain of 
command and occasionally augmented by personnel from another Battery. There is no 
community-wide database that retains the training data. It can be assumed that the various 
chains of command keep a local database or spreadsheet of some sort for localized 
tracking.  
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1. FM 3-01.86 
The publication defines the criteria for positive assessment within the various 
tables. These events are conducted and scored per the drill guidelines. An example drill 
guide is provided in Appendix B. The information to take away from reviewing the drill 
guide is that a sizable amount of data is manually recorded for each event. That 
information is not retained for common access by Army readiness managers.  
2. Unit Status Reporting 
The Unit Status Reporting system is equivalent to the SORTS tracking system. 
The Army uses a version of the SORTS software to prepare their Unit Status Reports 
(USRs). The information and data contained in USRs are entered into and maintained in 
the Army Status of Resources and Training System (ASORTS) database, which serves as 
the central registry and authorized database of record for all operational Army 
organizations and units.43 This information updates the Global SORTS system 
(GSORTS) which is that central data system used by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The above systems are scheduled to be replaced by the Defense Readiness Reporting 
System (DRRS).  
Units submit a USR on a regular basis and as needed when there is a significant 
change in status. The rating used within the system is determined by comparing the 
personnel, equipment and training status of unit with wartime requirements. It is the 
measure of a unit at a given point in time. The readiness ratings are described below: 
• C1: combat ready, no deficiencies 
• C2: combat ready, minor deficiencies 
• C3: combat ready, major deficiencies 
• C4: not combat ready 
• C5: not combat ready, programmed 
 
                                                 
43 Unit Status Reporting, Army Regulation 220-1.  
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In general, a Unit Status Report from a Patriot Battalion is very much akin to a 
SORTS message released by a Navy Cruiser. These reports provide operational-level and 
above planners the means to determine readiness and availability of units to respond to an 
operational requirement.  
The Patriot community process of certification is compatible with the Strategic 
Command directive. It is not apparent that the process is necessarily conducive to a 
‘process improvement through data collection and analysis’ approach. There does not 
appear to be a system in place that facilitates this organizational methodology. 
E. SUMMARY 
The Surface Navy system provides the user a means and a vehicle to track various 
data points, store that data in a usable format and display the data in meaningful ways to 
readiness managers and decision makers. It can loosely be aligned to the Capability 
Maturity Model Level Four in that the process is managed and driven by quantitative 
information that these systems provide. The Patriot process is possible the equivalent of a 
Level Two or Three system. Absent data collection at the unit level it is completely a 
subjective assignment. Clearly the system is repeatable by design but needs a much 
deeper level of data collection and data storage so that readiness managers can make 





V.  CONCLUSION 
The process used by the U.S. Army to certify Patriot crews in missile defense 
bears a generic resemblance to the process utilized by the U.S. Navy for the certification 
of ships in various warfare areas. In general both services combine successful completion 
of  training scenarios with the validation of specific administrative requirements in a 
repetitive cycle that produces ‘trained and ready’ crews. The above-mentioned process is 
monitored, and to a certain extent validated, by the reporting senior officer (or proxy). 
Units that are part of the Ballistic Missile Defense System are required by Strategic 
Command to adhere to that organization’s certification requirements as well.  Generally, 
the parent service program is accepted by Strategic Command as meeting their 
requirements. As these programs are directed by official instruction, they are periodically 
reviewed. A typical review occurs every two years. 
A. REVIEW 
The Navy directive concerning Ballistic Missile Defense uses the same structure 
that the Navy uses for other warfare areas. In general, the warfare area is assessed under 
four readiness pillars. There is a concerted effort to quantify the areas of assessment 
which facilitates capturing detailed information in a number of areas. The Army Field 
Manual 3-01.86 provides very specific guidance for operators and maintainers on what 
actions need to be taken. This type of direction lends itself to relatively easy 
quantification. However, this information is not categorized using the pillar concept 
(material, management, etc.) but by the functional components of a Patriot battery.  
An inventory of a typical Navy certification data sheet reveals 17 quantitative 
items measured and 222 qualitative items measured. The various Patriot check sheets 
account for over 300 items evaluated during certification. At present they are all in a 
qualitative form. It is technically possible to develop an information system in which the 
certifier or assessor can enter certification data in digital form. It is also possible to 
transform some of the qualitative items into a quantitative form. For example, a typical 
event includes an item in the form of “Assign target to Firing Unit” or “Resolve 
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equipment casualty;” these could easily be modified to “Assign target to Firing Unit 
within x timeframe” or “Resolve equipment casualty within x timeframe.” In most cases, 
these are already part of the drill anyway. The guidance and methodology are similar 
enough so that one can easily envision how the TORIS model could be adopted by 
another community or service branch.  
Assuming that there is agreement on the value of capturing corporate memory 
about the certification process the next step will include what product or solution would 
best fit the enterprise. The adoption of an enterprise-level solution for process 
management and data capture is a significant undertaking. It is also necessary to ensure 
that a project of this magnitude is initiated in a well-defined manner from the outset. 
According to Plato, “The beginning is the most important part of the work.” Options 
include co-opting the Navy model of TORIS, creating a solution internally or soliciting 
other solutions from external sources. It is recommended that, at a minimum, the Air 
Defense Artillery community examine the concept of an organizational memory construct 
for their own use.  
B. CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
Beyond the technical aspect of finding and instituting an enterprise-level, digital 
solution to the problem of retaining corporate memory, readiness managers at the 
executive level should be aware of resistance to change at the personnel level. For 
instance, the operational Army Patriot community is just one segment that would need to 
adapt to this new way of conducting, and more significantly, recording, business. The 
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) can be considered the owning 
interest among the stakeholders. They publish the overall certification standard and any 
modification to the certification procedure must be vetted and approved by TRADOC. A 
possible response (in some circles) would be to challenge the need to modify an already-
in-place-and-working-system. Why fix something if it is not broken? It is unclear 
whether decision-makers in the Patriot community, TRADOC included, consider the lack 
of enterprise-wide information availability regarding certification progress or the lack of 
a feedback loop to the schoolhouse organizations as a problem. This issue makes 
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implementing, or at least recommending, a change more complicated. Additionally, this 
change is not ‘adding IT’ to the back-end data collection part of the certification process; 
it is intended to accomplish what Markus describes as ‘technochange’44: a “significant 
improvement…in organizational outcome measures.” In this case, an example of 
improvement is expected to be in the quality of feedback data from operational Patriot 
units back to the parent training community.  
In change management a commonly accepted change equation is awareness of 
present state inadequacy (that leads to dissatisfaction) plus the revealing of an ideal or 
better future must be less than or equal to the cost of the change.  Decision-makers must 
be aware of this equation prior to instituting any significant process change. We can 
review the factors of that equation by community to find potential points of contention. 
The possibility of resistance to a technochange was mentioned earlier as it relates 
to the adoption of a computer-aided, data-driven system to replace the publication-based 
check sheets used by the Army during Patriot training and certification. This approach is 
common within the Army and is deeply embedded as a norm. The first factor in the 
equation is the creation of awareness that will lead to dissatisfaction with the checksheet 
approach. The point needs to be made that there is untold loss of data points in every 
Patriot graded (or un-graded) training evolution as long as the data is recorded on paper 
and filed away. Even if filed somewhere that data is not likely to be accessible to 
readiness managers or personnel within the larger training community. This information 
could potentially be warehoused in an electronic fashion and used by both operating and 
training agencies. At the Brigade level, the organization that assesses  and certifies 
operating units, there is a tremendous opportunity to address common shortcomings 
during exercises.  
Turning to the idea of presenting the target audience with an ‘ideal’ future, we can 
use the current Navy system as an example of a system that stores all of the certification 
requirements, monitors and updates unit progress or status, and provides that information 
not only to units and their commanders but also the training communities within the 
                                                 
44 M. Lynne Markus. “Technochange management: using IT to drive organizational change.” Journal 
of Information Technology (2004) 19.  
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various warfare areas. These ‘Centers of Excellence’ may not act upon that information 
but they have the option to do so. This is not a capability that currently resides within the 
TRADOC organization but the possibility for it to do so is realistic, viable and could 
provide a competitive advantage.  
There are at least two types of costs to assess in the change equation. The obvious 
one, financial, is outside the scope of this paper but can be estimated as relatively low for 
future use. For example, the Navy system was initially developed at a local command 
level, not at SPAWAR, at little direct economic expense. The less obvious cost is in 
terms of social capital. This can also be thought of as organizational culture capital. As 
described previously, this cost will likely be high. The cost is perhaps in the turmoil 
created by the “dialectic between old memory and new knowledge”45 where personnel 
invested in the old system, the checksheet approach, are moved to utilize an electronic 
aid. Assuming the TRADOC decision makers adopt a TORIS/TFOM-like system we can 
anticiapte that there will be buy-in from upper management. In the military there is an 
assumption that once ‘top brass’ institutes a policy there is immediate and unquestioned 
acceptance. Human nature indicates otherwise. There will be a social cost to pay and how 
the Patriot community, particularly at the Brigade level, approaches this cost will 
determine the ease or difficulty of implementation.  
The goals, as mentioned in the Surface Force Training Manual, are based on time 
reduction rather than stakeholder value. The change, and current transition, was directed 
from the top; the Surface Force Type Commander has immense authority as a force 
provider to the various operating fleets. The focus on ‘structure and systems’ seems 
evident. This may be a by-product of military culture in general but it serves as a 
reminder that the Navy implementation is more system-focused and less socio-cognitive 
based.  
The analysis above is not necessarily as comprehensive as it could be. The 
stakeholders within the missile defense community, at a minimum, would be well-served 
                                                 
45 Daniel Robey,  Jeanne Ross, Marie-Claude Boudreau. “Learning to implement enterprise systems: 
An exploratory study of the dialectics of change.” Journal of Management Information Systems; Summer 
2002 Vol.19. 
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to conduct a thorough study on the benefits of a system to determine feasibility.  Nor is 
the analysis meant to be critical; we are not likely to find a strategy that everyone will 
like and then implement it in a popular manner as well. If one ventures to the Surface 
Warfare Officer community of practice site called SWONET46 you are likely to find as 
much negative commentary on TORIS or TFOM as you will find positive.  Therefore, we 
can conclude that although the systems themselves are operational and likely effective, 
the effort made to implement them was imperfect.  
A cautionary note: this is not a suggestion that the Patriot community blindly 
follow the direct path taken by the Navy, nor is it meant to imply that they obtain TORIS 
from the Navy, change the names/labels of the data points and throw away the value of 
the pre-existing system. In other words, “don’t try to impose a canned solution developed 
somewhere else.”47To do so ignores organizational culture and will generate more ‘cost’ 
in units of resistance than is necessary. The change to a TORIS and TFOM-like model 
must be carefully thought out with as much detail as is available. The consequence for 
actual Patriot Battalions and Batteries remains significant. Not only is the certification of 
the units critical in deploying as an Air Defense capability, any stoppage or slowing of 
the ability to deploy could have potentially harmful results on the battlefield. Thus, 
it must be integrated in a way that addresses its impact throughout…it 
cannot deliver sustainable performance improvements unless it is part of a 
program that acknowledges and addresses the changes reengineering 
requires of corporate culture, configuration and coordination, and in…(the 
deployment) of its human, technological and information 
resources…..changes in any one dimension must be balanced with 
changes in every other dimension.48 
Using the technochange idea from before, Markus recommends prototyping as 
characteristic of a good process. To take that one step further, it is possible to create a 
“virtual” Patriot Battery to examine what a Patriot-based TORIS system would look like 
                                                 
46 SWONET https://www.swonet.com. 
47 Richard Luecke. “Managing Change and Transition.” Harvard Business Essentials, 2003. 
48 Donald Marchand, M.J. Stanford. “Business process Re-Design: A Framework for Harmonizing 
People, Information and Technology.” Business Process Change; Reengineering Concepts, Methods and 
Technologies. p. 37.  
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and, more importantly, what that Battery would experience as it uses the new system. 
This could theoretically eliminate unnecessary obstacles and provide the decision makers 
with an estimate of what this system would mean to a Battalion or Battery.  
It not much of a technological challenge to implement a database that contains all 
of the certification requirements, down to a granular level, that could be used by Patriot 
units. The Navy has a pre-existing product in the form of TORIS and TFOM that meets 
the needs of Naval surface forces and could be adopted to meet the needs of Army Patriot 
assets as well. The challenge is in (a) achieving Army buy-in at the appropriate level of 
command, (b) creating an environment in which a new certification process is willingly 
accepted, (c) recognizing the second and third order effects of the process change as it 
relates to the rest of the Army, specifically outside the Air Defense community, and (d) 
the same recognition of effects within the Air Defense community. The change equation 
reminds us to not ignore the ‘cost’ of this change. Whether the strategy taken is swift and 
hierarchical, or deliberate and flattened, there will be resistance.  
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the work done on this thesis, the following recommendations are 
offered: 
The certification processes in general follow a pattern of increasingly challenging 
milestones to be met prior to a culminating event. Every effort should be made to capture 
data associated with these milestone actions. It is recommended that the Missile Defense 
Agency and/or Strategic Command introduce an initiative to record and retain data 
associated with these events down to a granular (unit) level. In some cases, this data is 
already available to the parent service. It is further recommended that the Patriot 
community in particular consider an information technology solution for the issue of unit-
level readiness management. Quite possibly this solution may be applicable to more than 
just the Air Defense Artillery community within the Army. The Navy should consider 
converting the TORIS product into a more automated format, requiring less user 
involvement. This would eliminate any bias from the individual doing data entry and also 
minimize the perception of TORIS as an inconvenience to shipboard crews. 
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D. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis was limited in scope to only two elements within the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System. It is recommended that future research include other elements to include 
Air Force units, paying particular attention to the certification criteria used by the parent 
service. It also recommended that this research include the process that captures the 
discreet certification data. If this process is already automated in some capacity then an 
additional research area would be to investigate the linkage of that data to other readiness 
management systems.  
A research area that appears to have the most immediate need concerns the lack of 
an automated readiness management system within the Patriot Air Defense Artillery 
community. A model of a system (or systems) could be constructed for the community 
for and/or approval. This could be loosely based on the Navy’s TORIS system but could 
also be developed using other enterprise-level solutions from the commercial sector. A 
future project should include a detailed cost-benefit analysis of enterprise solutions 
available.  
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APPENDIX A:  EXAMPLE BMD TORIS DATA CARD 
The spreadsheet below details the information assessed and captured during a unit 
level Ballistic Missile Defense training event on a given Aegis warship.  
WBS Narrative                 
BMD-MATL01 
Combat Systems Suite 
Operability 0   Rollup         720 
BMD-MATL01.01.01 
PERCENT of newly 
installed 
equipment/software that 
has been installed since 
last ULTRA and has 
been SOVT’D.   1 LAST 70 100-90% 89-80% 80-70% 69-0% 720 
BMD-MATL01.01.02 
PERCENT of all required 
equipment and hardware 
necessary to support 
execution of a complex 
scenario.   1 LAST 70 100-90% 89-80% 80-70% 69-0% 90 
BMD-MATL01.01.03 
Did embedded training 
device material 
discrepancies not impact 
accomplishment of 
training objective? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-MATL01.01.04 
Was an ATG/ISIC 
observed OCSOT 
successfully completed? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 720 
BMD-MATL01.01.05 
Was an ATG/ISIC 
observed BMDSOT 
successfully completed? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 720 
BMD-MATL01.01.06 
Was an ATG/ISIC 
observed TSOT 
successfully completed? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 720 
BMD-MATL01.01.07 
Was an ATG/ISIC 
observed DSOT 





tasking and warnings via 




operational? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-MGMT01 
Completion of ASA 
Check sheets 0   Rollup         720 
BMD-MGMT01.01 
What is the percent of 
ASA Checklist items in 
full compliance? 1 LAST 70 100-90% 89-80% 80-70% 69-0% 720 
BMD-MGMT01.02 
Is there a plan to correct 
all deficiencies?  (If 
100% of items are in full 
compliance, enter Yes) 1 LAST Y YES     NO 720 
BMD-MGMT02 
Battle Orders signed by 
current Commanding 




(WTRP) 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-MGMT03.01 
Does the WTRP include 
required watch teams? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-MGMT03.02 Does the WTRP include 1 LAST Y YES     NO 90 
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the training team? 
BMD-MGMT03.03 
Does the WTRP extend 
one year into the future, 
quarter by quarter, to 
preclude unnecessary 
watch team changes that 
adversely affect training 
progress for the team as 
a whole? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PERS01 
Meet 80% Required 
Schools 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PERS01.01 
What is the PERCENT of 
all NTMPS required 
courses? (Use the SOP 
on ATG’s web site to 
determine this 
PERCENT.) 1 LAST 70 100-90% 89-80% 80-70% 69-0% 90 
BMD-PERS01.02 
How many unfulfilled 
course requirements are 
NOT matched with 
confirmed quotas? 1 LAST 1 0     =>1 90 
BMD-PERS01.03 
Is there a long range 
school/course 
management plan 
projecting four quarters? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PERS02 
PQS Qualified Training 
Team capable of training 
all watch teams 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PERS02.01 
What is the number of 
training team members 
NOT qualified for the 
positions they’re 
observing. 1 LAST 1 0     =>1 90 
BMD-PERS02.02 
What is the number of 
training team members 
NOT designated in 
writing by the 
Commanding Officer. 1 LAST 1 0     =>1 90 
BMD-PERS03 
PQS Qualified Watch 
Teams (Determined from 
RADMIN printout) 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PERS03.01 
What is the number of 
watchstanders for BMD, 
watchsection 1 NOT 
PQS qualified. 1 LAST 1 0     =>1 90 
BMD-PERS03.02 
What is the number of 
watchstanders for BMD, 
watchsection 2 NOT 
PQS qualified. 1 LAST 1 0     =>1 90 
BMD-PERS03.03 
What is the number of 
watchstanders for BMD 
watchsection 3 (CSTT), 
NOT PQS qualified. 1 LAST 1 0     =>1 90 
BMD-PROF01 
Training Team 
proficiency 0   Rollup         210 
BMD-PROF01.01 
Establish Training 
Teams and Training 
Program 0   Rollup         210 
BMD-PROF01.01.01 
Train and Qualify 
Training Teams 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.01.01.01 
Were all TT members 
designated in writing by 
commanding officer? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.01.01.02 
Were all TT members 
PQS/JQR qualified, 
including interim qual, to 





Plan and Prepare for 
Training Event(s) 0   Rollup         210 
BMD-PROF01.02.01 Initial Planning 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.02.01.01 
Were watch teams and 
watchstanders per 
approved watch bill? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.01.02 
Was feedback and 
lessons learned from the 
last occurrence of this 
exercise reviewed in the 
planning process? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.01.03 
Were new drill guides 
hot checked prior to 
inclusion in the 




(ORM) 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.02.02.01 
Was an assessment of 
hazards conducted? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.02.02 
Were risk decisions and 




communicated to lowest 
level? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.02.04 
Was proper supervision 
of the evolution carried 
out? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.02.05 
Were safety procedures 
and operational risk 
management 
considered? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.02.06 
Was a response plan 
established in the event 
of an actual casualty? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.03 Scenario Package 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.02.03.01 
Did drill guides/plans 
provided stimulate 
systems and use 
applicable embedded 
training systems to 
provide maximum 




systems used? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.03.03 
Were training team 
communications 
identified? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.03.04 
Were watch team 
communications 
identified? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.03.05 
Were procedures for 
maintaining real world 
navigation and tactical 
picture included in the 
package? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.03.06 
Was the exercise 
scheduled through the 
chain of command to 
ensure required 
resources were available 
(e.g. equipment, 




Did the ITT and TT 
identify coordination 
required between 
departments to achieve 
integrated training and 
casualty control 
objectives? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.02.03.08 
Was the exercise 
package approved in 
writing by the 
commanding officer? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03 Brief Training Event(s) 0   Rollup         210 
BMD-PROF01.03.01 TT Coordination with ITT 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.03.01.01 
Were individual TT 
coordination 
requirements briefed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02 Brief Individual TT 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.01 
Were evaluation sheets 
reviewed and 
distributed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.02 
Were coordination 
requirements briefed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.03 
Were exercise initiators, 
safety observers, and 
evaluators assigned and 
briefed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.04 
Was the level of training 
team involvement 
briefed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.05 
Were embedded trainers 
to be used briefed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.06 
Were any actual or 
simulated changes to the 
plant or equipment 
status briefed to the TT? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.07 
Was coordination for use 
of embedded trainers 




deviations discussed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.09 
Were exercise disclosure 
procedures and timing 
discussed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.10 
Were casualty insertion 
procedures and timing 
discussed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.11 
Were all integration 
points identified? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.02.12 
Were primary and 
alternate 
communications for 
training team members 
identified? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.03 
Brief Safety and Training 
Time Out Procedures 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.03.03.01 
Were training time out 
procedures briefed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.03.02 
Were safety procedures 
and operational risk 
management briefed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.03.03 
Was control of cascading 
casualty control events 
discussed? 0             210 
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BMD-PROF01.03.03.04 
Was a response plan 
established in the event 
of an actual casualty? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.03.05 
Was real world tactical 
situation/considerations 
briefed to all team 
members? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.03.06 
Was feedback from the 
last time this exercise 
was conducted briefed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.04 Brief Watch Teams 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.03.04.01 
Was an exercise brief 
conducted within 24 
hours of the event? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.04.02 
Did watch team attended 
the brief? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.04.03 
Was an exercise time or 
schedule of events 
published? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.04.04 
Were major events 
discussed, particularly 
for at-sea exercises? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.04.05 
Was real world tactical 
situation/considerations 
briefed to all team 
members? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.03.04.06 
Were any actual or 
simulated changes to the 
plant or equipment 
changes briefed to 
watchstanders and 
watch teams? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04 
Execute Training 
Event(s) 0   Rollup         210 
BMD-PROF01.04.01 
Were preparations 
properly executed? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.04.01.01 
Did evaluators arrive on 
station before exercise 
COMEX and conduct 
required safety walk-
through? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.01.02 
Were special safety 
considerations identified 
during risk assessment 
reviewed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.01.03 
Did training team 
members safely rig 
simulations or alter 
equipment/system 
configurations to achieve 
exercise objectives? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.01.04 
Was a sight inventory 
and/or op-test of all 
equipment completed 
prior to drill? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.01.05 
Were props/publications 
prestaged as required? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.01.06 
Was a time check 
conducted prior to 
COMEX? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.01.07 
Were coordination and 
internal communications 
sufficient to support 
exercise objectives? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02 
Was event properly 
executed? 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 





messages delivered as 
briefed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.03 
Was time line 
maintained? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.04 
Were disclosures per 
approved ship’s 
disclosure list 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.05 
Did evaluators provide 
only minimum prompting 
to prevent disruption of 
the exercise? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.06 
Were safety observers 
on station? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.07 
Did the team internally 
update and pass key 
information? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.08 
Did casualties have 
appropriate cause and 
effect? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.09 
Were training time-outs 
called when required? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.10 
Were safety procedures 
used and enforced? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.11 
Were all unsafe 
conditions recognized 
and/or corrected before 
occurrence of casualty? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.02.12 
Was the training team 
supervision and control 
of the exercise effective? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.03 
Assess Team and 
Individual Performances 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.04.03.01 
Did evaluators observe 
and evaluate all factors 
in drill guides and on 
evaluation sheets? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.03.02 
Did evaluators verbally 
question watch 
standers? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.03.03 
Did imposed casualties 
tactically impact 
performance? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.04.04 
What PERCENT of 
planned integration 
points were successfully 
executed? Integration is 
defined in SFTM para 
3106.  1 LAST 60 100-86% 85-71% 70-60% 59-0% 210 
BMD-PROF01.05 Debrief Training Event(s) 0   Rollup         210 
BMD-PROF01.05.01 
Conduct Post-Event 
Watchstander / Watch 
Team Debrief 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.05.01.01 
Was a watchstander / 
watch team debrief 
conducted by the TT 
within 2 hours of 
exercise completion? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.05.01.02 




(how well) and 
diagnostic (why success 
or failure) feedback of 
the training event? 0             210 
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BMD-PROF01.05.01.03 
Were safety violations 
and deviations from 
doctrine addressed? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.05.01.04 
Did training teams 
identify enabling 
objectives met/not met? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.05.02 
Conduct Post-Event 
Training Team Debrief 1 LAST Y YES     NO 210 
BMD-PROF01.05.02.01 
Were individual TT 
debriefs conducted by 
the integrated TT? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.05.02.02 
Did training teams 
identify enabling 
objectives met/not met? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.05.02.03 
Did the training team 
self-correct mistakes? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.05.02.04 
Were completed 
evaluation sheets and 
exercise comments 
forwarded to the 
commanding officer? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.05.02.05 
Were lessons learned 
documented in writing? 0             210 
BMD-PROF01.06 
What is the difference in 
TFOM score of the 
Mission Area between 
ATG at last ULTRA and 
the ship at last ULTRA? 1 LAST 10 0-4% 5-8% 9-10% >10% 210 
BMD-PROF02 
Demonstrate proficiency 
in a complex level BMD 
LRS&T and Engagement 
Scenario 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF02.01 
Analyze and plan for an 
LRS&T/engagement 
mission 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01 
Was Watchteam INTEL 
brief conducted? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.01 
Did brief review 
applicable items of the 
CSTP and CTM? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.02 
Did the brief review 
applicable readiness 
condition (REDCON) 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.03 
Did the brief review Navy 
Wide OPTASK? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.04 
Did the brief review 
applicable TACMEMOS? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.05 
Did the brief review 
applicable items of the 
CO’s Battle Orders? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.06 
Did the brief review the 
communications plan? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.07 
Did the brief review 
which watchstation will 
make the call to role 
back to self defense? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.08 
Did the brief review 
Enemy Order of Battle 
(EOB)/ Enemy Electronic 
Order of Battle (EEOB)/ 
Enemy Missile Order of 
Battle(EOB)? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.09 
Did the brief review 
threat capabilities, 
limitations and counter 
detection ranges? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.10 Did the brief include an 0             90 
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intelligence summary of 
the AOR? 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.11 
Did the brief review 
environmental 
information? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.12 
Did the brief review 
current equipment 
operational status? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.13 
Did the brief cover non-
organic assets 
available? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.01.01.14 
Did the brief cover 
assigned defended 




systems to include 
transition from BMD to 
baseline tactical. 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF02.02.01 
Were sensors and 
associated systems 
configured to support 
Free Form/Predefined 
Radar Doctrine. 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.02.01.01 
Did AAWC/CSC define 
launch area? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.02.01.02 
Did CSC/AAWC define 
ship operating area? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.02.01.03 
Did RSC select launch 
area defined by 
AAWC/CSC? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.02.01.04 
Were SPY sectors 
developed to support 
tracking objective IAW 
mission planner and 
independently verified by 
designated 
watchstander? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.02.01.05 
Were sectors manually 
initiated/associated IAW 
mission planner? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.02.01.06 
Did CSC/AAWC enable 
ownship in BMD on 
station alert? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.02.01.07 
Did CSC/AAWC enable 
remote engagement 
authorized? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.02.02 
Configure sensors and 
associated systems to 
support SPY Cued 
Acquisition. 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.02.02.01 
Was cued acquisition 
initiated  via C&D 
doctrine or manual VAB 
action? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.02.02.02 
Did CSC define a Point 
of Interest for cued 
acquisition doctrine? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.02.02.03 
Was a re-attempt made 
if first attempt 
unsuccessful? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.03 
Demonstrate successful 
surveillance and tracking 
against 3 long range, 
simulated ballistic 
missiles 0   Rollup         90 
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BMD-PROF02.03.01 
Did BMD watchteam 
demonstrate successful 
surveillance and tracking 
in support of LRS&T 
mission. 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.03.02 
Was track categorized 
as either Air or BM?    0             90 
BMD-PROF02.03.03 
Was primary object 
identified? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.03.04 
Were new tracks(child 
tracks) detected?   0             90 
BMD-PROF02.03.05 
Were voice reports made 
IAW OPTASK COMMS? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.03.06 
Were proper voice 
reports made if system is 
down w/in 5 minutes? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.04 
Demonstrate the ability 
to send  and receive 
cueing data via SAT Link 
16. 1 AVG Y         90 
BMD-PROF02.05 
Effectively operate all 
installed BMD 
information and reporting 
systems. 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF02.05.01 
Was C&D Adjunct 
initialized IAW CSOSS? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.05.01.01 
Was C&D Adjunct data 




tactical to BMD w/in 20 
minutes? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.01.03 
Were the applicable 
weapons systems placed 
in stand alone mode? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.01.04 
Did the watchstanders 
demonstrate knowledge 
and procedures of 
firebreaks in applicable 
weapon systems? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.02 
Was Mission Planner 
initialized IAW User 
Guide? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03 
Was the data entered 
correctly into Mission 
Planner? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.01 
Was ships mission 
(surveillance or 
engagement) entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.02 
Was task type 
(surveillance or 
engagement) entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.03 
Was task priority 
(primary or secondary) 
entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.04 
Was launch area(s) 
(location, size, 





orientation) entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.06 
Were the threat types(for 
each associated launch 
area) entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.07 
Was ship position 
(lat/long) entered? 0             90 
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BMD-PROF02.05.03.08 
Was SPY search 
elevation entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.09 
Was minimum water 
depth entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.10 
Was Weapons 
Doctrine(s) entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.11 
Was Defended Area 
Footprint calculated? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.12 
Was Launch Area 
Denied calculated? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.13 
Was SM-3 missile type 
entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.14 
Was radar sensitivity 
accurately entered? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.03.15 
Was Mission Planner 
data recording initialized 
at start-up? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.04 
Was Vertical Launching 
System (MK 41) properly 
initialized? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.05.04.01 
Was LCU(s) initialized 
IAW CSOSS? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.04.02 
Were CSES enabled for 
applicable cells by 
launcher crew? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.04.03 Was FIS/RLEP enabled? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.05 





procedures? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.05.05.01 
Did the operator load 
COMSEC IAW EE130-
DU-OMI-010/USQ-151 
Load Key Procedures 
procedures? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.06 
Did CSC/ AWC receive 
IBS-S missile queuing 
alert from AN/USQ-151 
(JTT-M)? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.05.07 
Was Missile Acquisition  
Data  transmitted via 
AN/USQ-151           
(JTT-M)? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.05.07.01 
Did RSC build a 
Dynamic Test Track 
(DTT) utilizing A-STATS/ 
ACTS 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.05.07.02 
Did unit transmit DTT 
over IBS-I network. 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.06 
Demonstrate the ability 
to conduct area-defense 
while configured for BMD 
mission 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF02.06.01 
Were applicable systems 
available while 
configured for BMD 
mission? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.06.01.01 
Was CIWS available 
while configured for BMD 
mission? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.06.01.02 
Was the 5” Gun 
available while 
configured for BMD 
mission? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.06.01.03 Was the AN/SPS-49 0             90 
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available while 
configured for BMD 
mission? 
BMD-PROF02.06.01.04 
Was SCUS available 
while configured for BMD 
mission? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.06.02 
Engage threat(s) with 
ownships area-defense 
weapon(s) while 
configured for BMD 
mission. 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF02.06.02.01 
Was the RSC able to 
maintain appropriate 
AAW Search Frame 
Times while configured 
for BMD? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.06.02.02 
What is the PERCENT of 
successful SM-2 
engagements? 1 AVG 70 100-90% 89-80% 80-70% 69-0% 90 
BMD-PROF02.06.02.03 
Engage threat(s) with 
point defense system 
(CIWS). 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.06.02.04 
Engage threat(s) with 
gun fire control system. 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.06.02.05 
Engage threat(s) with 
ESSM. 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.07 
Control Combat Systems 
Casualty Area 
Supervisor. 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF02.07.01 
Was OPSCAP report 
made w/in 5 minutes? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.07.02 
Equipment casualty 
restoral in BMD spaces 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.07.02.01 
Was the equipment 
casualty observed and 
reported to 
CSOOW/ECC? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.07.02.02 
Was initial investigation 
of casualty conducted? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.07.02.03 
Was alternate equipment 
configuration available 




demonstrated? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.07.02.05 
Was the casualty 
repaired? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.07.02.06 Were all reports made? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.07.03 
Proper use of Electronic 
Casualty Control/CSOSS 
folder in BMD spaces 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.07.03.01 
Was an Electronic 
Casualty Control 
folder/CSOSS manual 
available?  0             90 
BMD-PROF02.07.03.02 
Was the Electronic 
Casualty Control 
folder/CSOSS manual 
complete? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.07.03.03 
Was the Casualty control 
folder/CSOSS manual 
used? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.07.03.04 
Was the correct 
Electronic Casualty 
Control/CSOSS 
procedure used for each 
casualty?  0             90 
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BMD-PROF02.08 Engage BM Target 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF02.08.01 
Was appropriate weapon 
doctrine statements 
activated? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.08.01.01 
Was Spy radar 
configured per 
CSTP/CO’s battle 
orders? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.01.02 
Was C&D configured per 
CSTP/CO’s battle 
orders? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.01.03 
Was WCS configured 
per CSTP/CO’s battle 




doctrine selected IAW 
CO’s Battle Orders? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02 
Was the  target(s) 
engaged with SM-3 
missile(s)? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.01 
Was equipment and 
associated systems 
configured per CO’s 
battle orders/CSTP? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.02 
Were pre-fire checks 
completed for applicable 
systems? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.03 
Was Launcher manning 
per Combat System 
Doctrine? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.04 
Were required keys on 
station per governing 
directives? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.05 
Was the lethal object 
designated? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.06 
Was target correctly 
identified as Group A/B? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.07 
Was engagement order 
sent to C&D via CSC or 





activated? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.09 
Was Fire Authorization 
Bypass enabled? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.10 
Was proper report made 
by MSS? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.02.11 
Were appropriate voice 
reports made IAW 
current OPTASK? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.03 
What is the PERCENT of 
successful SM-3 
engagements? 1 AVG 70 100-90% 89-80% 80-70% 69-0% 90 
BMD-PROF02.08.04 
Was Kill Assessment 
made for possible re-
engagement? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF02.08.04.01 
Was there KW telemetry 
data after the predicted 
intercept time? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.04.02 
If “No Kill,” was a re-
engagement planned? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.04.03 
Were the proper voice 
reports made IAW 
current OPTASK? 0             90 
BMD-PROF02.08.04.04 Were the engagement 0             90 
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results transmitted via 
Sat Link 16? 
BMD-PROF03 
Demonstrate proficiency 
in IBS-I 0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF03.01 
Are there two producer 
certified watchteams and 
CSTT member? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF03.02 
Participation in Monthly 
Inport Training 
Exercises.  0   Rollup         90 
BMD-PROF03.02.01 
How many unexcused 
MITE’s were recorded in 
the last 90? 1 AVG 1 0     =>1 90 
BMD-PROF03.03 





procedures? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF03.03.01 





procedures 0             90 
BMD-PROF03.03.02 
Did the operator load 
COMSEC IAW EE130-
DU-OMI-010/USQ-151 
Load Key Procedures 
procedures 0             90 
BMD-PROF03.04 
Did CSC/ AWC receive 
IBS-S missile queuing 
alert from AN/USQ-151 
(JTT-M)? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF03.05 
Was Missile Acquisition  
Data  transmitted via 
AN/USQ-151           
(JTT-M)? 1 AVG Y YES     NO 90 
BMD-PROF03.05.01 
Did RSC build a 
Dynamic Test Track 
(DTT) utilizing A-STATS/ 
ACTS 0             90 
BMD-PROF03.05.02 
Did unit transmit DTT 
over IBS-I network. 0             90 
BMD-PROF04 
Watch Team Level of 
Knowledge Exam (LOK) 0   Rollup         120 
BMD-PROF04.01 Quarterly LOK exam 1 LAST 70 100-90% 89-80% 79-70% 69-0% 120 
BMD-PROF04.02 ULTRA LOK exam 1 LAST 70 100-90% 89-80% 79-70% 69-0% 720 
BMD-PROF04.03 
Are LOK exams 
administered to 
individual watchstanders 
each time a new PQS 
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APPENDIX B:  EXAMPLE PATRIOT DRILL CARD 
The following is example guidance on the assessment scoring of a Patriot Battery 
during certification –level events. 
Performance Measures             ARTEP 44-635-13 
DRILL 
 
___ 1  CM1 maneuver truck into position.  CM2/3 assist CM1. 
___ 2.  CM2/3 “Halt,” chock vehicle. CM1 exit vehicle. 
___ 3.  CM1/2 lower tailgate and position ladder. CM3 unstow two VHF whip antennas. 
___ 4.  CM1 Raise DLU platform. CM2/3 secure PE rack.  CM2 unlock shelter. 
___ 5.  If required CM1/2/3 install PE. (Evaluator has the option of waiting until after alert state 
assumption and system validation to issue an INTSUM or other input that initiates 
installation of MCPE). 
___ 6.  CM3 receive and record the magnetic heading of AMG. 
___ 7.  CM1 open and lock all front air vents.  CM2 open and lock all rear air vents.  
CM3 connect AMG power, control and RF cables. 
___ 8.  CM1 roll/secure air conditioner covers. CM2 Ensure all air vents and covers are open. 
___ 9.  CM1 set handle to SUMMER or WINTER position as appropriate at forward roadside water 
intrusion duct.  
___ 10.  CM1/2 unwind and carry RWCIU cable to RS. 
___ 11.  CM1/2 Ground ECS.  
___ 12.  CM1/2 retrieve and connect ECS-EPP control and power cables. 
___ 13.  CM1/2 prepare DLT antenna. 
___ 14.  CM1/2 install DLT antenna. 
___ 15.  CM1/2 erect DLT antenna. 
___ 16.  CM1 prepare ECS switches for power-up and operation. CM2 Assist CM1w/ power up and, 
or fiber installation. CM/3 Initialize VHF radios. 
___ 17.  CM1/2/3 If required, install corner reflectors. (Evaluator has the option of waiting until after 
alert state assumption and system validation to issue a new communication plan or other input that 
requires installation of corner reflectors). 
___ 18.  CM1 unstow chairs for manstations.  CM2 unstow publications/documents required for 
initialization.  
___ 19.  CM1 perform DLT Init. CM2 power up LCU  CM3 perform AMG circuit checks. 
___ 20.  CM1/2 perform DLU AN/VRC-90 quick or full load start. CM3 alignment of AMG antennas. 
___ 21.  CM1 verify ICOM RADIO hopset and lockout sets are loaded.  CM3 connect UHF   
                    AN/GRC-103. 
___ 22.  CM1 verify ANCD TOD. CM3 power-up and align priority UHF AN/GRC-103. 
___ 23.  CM1 verify ICOM radio TOD.  CM3 voice communications system cntl. Panel ops. 
___ 24.  CM1 verify COMSEC code is loaded. 
___ 25.  CM1 inform OIC the ECS is ready for initialization. 
___ 26.  CM1 load TACI software. CM 2 retrieve and install software. 
___ 27.  CM1/2 begin data acquisition. 
NOTE:  If mapping is performed, skip step 28. 
___ 28.  CM1 skip mapping.  CM2 verify RS position. 
___ 29.  CM1 perform mapping for PTL or STLs and PTL ( The decision to perform mapping is based 
upon the unit’s directed alert state. The type of mapping willbe based upon the current terrain). 
___ 30.  CM1 observe ENTER ALTERN SEARCH CONTR DATA alert appears.  Press ALERT 
ACK. CM2 Terminate Manual input when informed by CM1 that system is ready for TAC 
OPS. 
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___ 31.  CM1 observe tab 90 (DATA COLLECTION CONTROL) appear. 
___ 32.  CM1 observe alert END MANUAL INPUT WITH TAB 98 appears.  Press ALERT ACK at  
   appropriate time. 
 
___ 33.  CM1 observe alert HARCOPY LS DATA—TAB 85 appears.  Press ALERT ACK. 
___ 34.  CM1 observe alert REVIEW HARD COPY DATABASE, press ALERT ACK.  Observe 
ALERT ACK WRITES DATABASE, press ALERT ACK to initiate writing of the database 
to FU disk. 
___ 35.  CM1 observe N symbol appears on lower left section of CRT with a line oriented toward 
north, relative to target line. 
___ 36.  CM1 observe auxiliary message STORAGE MEDIUM BUSY and alert LOAD TACT SW.  
Clear message and alert by pressing ALERT ACK. 
___ 37.  CM1 observe switches DATA COLL and DATA HRDCPY (if on) go off. 
___ 38.  CM1/2 load operational K7 software. 
___ 39.  CM1/3 standby until you commence tactical operations.  CM2 direct crew to prepare for 
tactical operations. 
___ 40.  TCA/TCO ensure the ECS has been initialized and the operational software is loaded.  31R 
Monitor UHF and VHF radios. 
___ 41.  TCA/TCO select S/I’s IAW TSOP.  31R check RLRIU and ensure local address is correct. 
___ 42.  TCA/TCO enter data in tactical tabs according to TSOP.  31R report to TCO “Ready for 
Action.”  
___ 43.  TCA determine missile status by observing the missile inventory tabs and FU status panel.  
TCO observe FU status panel and ensure proper indications are displayed for the tactical 
situation. 
___ 44.  TCA observe BITE panel for abnormal indications.  TCO evaluates operational assessment 
tab. 
___ 45.  TCA evaluates operational assessment tab.  TCO ensures equipment requirements are met. 
___ 46.  TCA configures radar IAW directed alert state.  TCO verbally reports to ICC, “ECS at battle 
stations with minimum engagement capability.” 
___ 47.        TCO sends “Green Bar” to the ICC upon alert state assumption. 
 
 
CM1/PCS Date:__________________________ Start Time: _____________     Score:  100 
 
CM2/PCS Date:__________________________  End Time:     _____________         Deducted ___ 
 
CM3/PCS Date:__________________________ Total Time: _____________   Total  ___ 
 
 
Evaluator: ____________________ Signature: _________________  Date: __________ 
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Scoring Criteria: 
1.  Crew must achieve a minimum passing score of 70/100 for Gunnery Table certification. 
2.  Point deductions: 
a. Subtract 3 points for each incorrectly executed performance measure. 
b. Subtract 6 points for each missed performance measure. 
c. Subtract 31 points for each DANGER, 16 points for each WARNING, and 10 points for each 
CAUTION violation.  
d. Subtract 31 points for exceeding maximum time for minimum engagement or alert state 
assumption (Table VIII- 45 min engagement / 60 min AS assumption, Table XII - 90 min min 
engagement / 120 min AS assumption). Any error found in Tabs 1, 5, 6, 54, 55, 70, 71, 73, 76, 78, 
79, 81, 85 will result in an invalid minimum engage and alert state assumption. 
e. Subtract 31 points if equipment found to be NMC and not previously recorded. 
 








Explanation for point deduction. (Include page # and step #  from ARTEP Drill 
and any other reference)   
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 ___ 1. The commander or leader conducts friendly protection.  Ensures engagement causes no 
friendly casualties.  
  ___ a.  IFF procedures. 
  ___ b.  Aircraft ID. 
  ___ c.  Weapon control status implementation. (WT, WF, WH) 
  ___ d.  Demonstrate understanding of Fire Control Orders: 
  (1) Engage 
  (2) Hold fire. 
  (3) Cease fire. 
  (4) Engage hold. 
  ___ e. Demonstrate understanding of ACO.   
  ___ f.  Demonstrate understanding of TSOP. 
 
                   Evaluator will ask questions 
 ___ 2.  TCO performs air battle procedures using IFF information, directions from higher  
  headquarters, and other airspace control means. 
___ a.  Operates MS 3 and performs friendly protect function and weapons control 
function in ABT mode. 
  ___ b.  Ensures the system is in the assigned identification mode and configuration . 
  ___ c.  De-conflicts and verifies the identity of all targets. 
  ___ d.  Activates the SIF and Mode 4  IFF. 
  ___ e.  Monitors the situation display, alert line, and tabular display areas. 
  ___ f.   Implements changes which are provided to the battery party line communications. 
  ___ g.  Activates and deactivates weapons control volumes and defended assets. 
  ___ h.  Uses engagement override switches to ensure non-hostile aircraft are not engaged. 
  ___ I.   Manually activates IFF to interrogate targets. 
___ j.   Performs ECCM assist as directed by higher headquarters to assist in range-
solving ECM tracks. 
  ___ k.  Activates manual clutter mapping. 
  ___ l.   Monitors party line for air battle communications. 
___ k.  Verifies TCA engagements are made according to the current weapon control 
status. 
 ___ 3.  TCA performs the air battle procedures using the TCO’s instructions, direction from higher  
  headquarters, and other airspace control means. 
  ___ a.  Operates MS1 and performs weapons control function during heavy TBM  
  activity. 
  ___ b.  Ensures system is in the correct mode of control and engagement mode. 
  ___ c.  Controls system radiation based on directions provided and mission requirements. 
  ___ d.  Ensures  LS OPERATE/STANDBY switches are activated as directed by Alert 
State. 
  ___ e.  Monitors status control panel for LS status,  missile count, DEFCON, and Alert 
State. 
___ f.   Engages targets employing the ROE and supplemental fire control measures in 
effect.(ABT) 
  ___ g.  Activates/deactivates AREAS ENABLE. 
  ___ f.   Monitors party line for air battle communications. 
 ___ 4.  Communications operator located at MS2 performs communications functions. 
  ___ a.  Monitors/performs checks on the tactical FM & UHF circuits. 
  ___ b.  Checks DLU, RLRIU, LCU and UHF racks for operational status. 
  ___ c.  Checks AMG. 
  ___ d.  Rotates/elevates UHF antenna. 
  ___ e.  Wires communications panel per CRL. 
 
 ___ 5.  The TCO conducts the air battle in the centralized mode of control. 
___ a.  Detects, identifies, and evaluates aircraft (or TBM) in the battery’s area of 
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responsibility. 
  ___ b.  Reports newly acquired tracks (or TBM) to the controlling authority. 
___ c.  Act upon all track (or TBM) assignments and tactical orders from the controlling 
authority. 
  ___ d.  Acknowledges the assignments, and delegates engagements to TCA. 
___ e.  Evaluates by SUPLANs and doctrine, unassigned high threat tracks for possible 
engagement.(ABT) 
  ___ f.  Enforces EMCON silent procedures. 
  ___ g.  Identifies aircraft in violation of airspace control rules.(ABT) 
  ___ h.  Ensures mission activity results are reported. 
  ___ I.  Ensures CP is informed of major activities, as time permits. 
___ j.  Identifies aircraft committing hostile acts and assigns them for engagement. 
(ABT) 
  ___ k.Ensures engagement results are reported to the controlling authority. 
  ___ l. Ensures a missile status report is sent to the controlling authority. 
 ___ 6.  The TCO conducts the air battle in the decentralized mode of control (ECS method of  
  operation-in response to an order with an active data link). 
  ___ a.  Responds to an order from higher authority to go to decentralized. 
  ___ b.  Informs CP the battery is operating in the decentralized mode of control with  
  higher authority exercising management by exception. 
  ___ c.  Detects, identifies, and evaluates aircraft (or TBM) in the battery’s area of  
  responsibility. 
  ___ d.  Reports newly acquired tracks (or TBM) to the controlling authority. 
  ___ e.  Acts upon all track (or TBM) assignments and tactical orders from the controlling  
  authority. 
  ___ f.   Engages the targets and acknowledges receipt of assignments. 
  ___ g.  Evaluates by SUPLANs and doctrine, unassigned high threat tracks for possible  
  engagement.(ABT) 
  ___ h.  Enforces EMCON silent procedures. 
  ___ I.  Identifies aircraft in violation of airspace control rules.(ABT) 
  ___ j.  Ensures mission activity results are reported. 
  ___ k  Ensures CP is informed of major activities, as time permits. 
  ___ l.  Identifies and assigns aircraft committing hostile acts.(ABT) 
  ___ m.  Orders the proper method of fire after an assessment of the track.(ABT) 
  ___ n.  Ensures engagement results are reported to the controlling authority. 
  ___ o.  Ensures a missile status report is sent to the controlling authority. 
 
 ___ 7. The TCO conducts the air battle in the independent mode of control (ECS method of 
operation-in response to data link loss to higher authority). 
  ___ a.  Rapidly recognizes a loss of UHF Communications and determines the extent of  
  communications lost. 
___ b.  Places battery in decentralized operations upon data link communications loss to 
higher HQ. 
  ___ c.  Detects, identifies, and evaluates aircraft (or TBM) in the battery’s area of  
  responsibility. 
  ___ d.  Reports newly acquired tracks (or TBM) to the controlling authority using any  
  means available. 
  ___ e.  Assigns the targets to the appropriate FU. 
  ___ f.  Evaluates by SUPLANs and doctrine, unassigned high threat tracks for possible  
  engagement.(ABT) 
  ___ g.  Enforces EMCON silent procedures. 
  ___ h.  Identifies aircraft in violation of airspace control rules.(ABT) 
  ___ I.  Ensures mission activity results are reported. 
  ___ j.  Ensures CP is informed of major activities, as time permits. 
  ___ k.  Identifies and assigns aircraft committing hostile acts.(ABT) 
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  ___ l.   Orders the proper method of fire after an assessment of the track.(ABT) 
  ___ m. Ensures engagement results are reported to the controlling authority. 
  ___ n.  Ensures a missile status report is sent to the controlling authority.  
 
 ___ 8. The TCO conducts the air battle in the autonomous mode of control (ECS method of 
operation-in response to the loss of all communications with the higher authority). 
___ a.  Rapidly recognizes a loss of all external communications and declares the battery 
at autonomous mode of control. 
  ___ b.  Notifies the battery commander . 
___ c.  Detects, identifies, and evaluates aircraft (or TBM)  in the battery’s area of 
responsibility. 
  ___ d.  Evaluates by SUPLANs and doctrine, unassigned high threat tracks for possible  
  engagement.(ABT) 
  ___ e.  Enforces EMCON silent procedures. 
  ___ f.   Identifies aircraft in violation of airspace control rules. (ABT) 
  ___ g.  Ensures mission activity results are reported. 
  ___ h.  Ensures CP is informed of major activities, as time permits. 
  ___ I.  Identifies and assigns aircraft committing hostile acts. (ABT) 
  ___ j.  Orders the proper method of fire after an assessment of the track.(ABT) 
  ___ k.  Ensures engagement results are reported to the controlling authority. 
 
 ___ 9. TCO directs the optimal target engagement. 
  ___ a.  Assigns targets by threat priority. 
  ___ b.  Directs the FU engagement of hostile aircraft .(ABT) 
  ___ c.  Assigns OPFOR aircraft engagements IAW TSOP and TTPs.(ABT) 
  ___ d.  Allows friendly aircraft to perform their assigned missions. (ABT) 
  ___ e.  TCA will assist during all TBM operations and monitor MS1 for additional  
  TBMs. 
  
___ 10. TCO and TCA keep TOC updated on tactical information. 
  ___ a.  ACO. 
  ___ b.  Kills. 
  ___ c.  Missile expenditures. 
  ___ d.  Equipment status. 
  ___ e.  ECM/ECCM. 
  ___ f.  Significant air threat changes. 
  ___ g.  Equipment outage information. 
  ___ h.  Communications status. 
  ___ I.   Report any and all unusual track (ABT/TBM) type data. 
 
 ___ 11. TCO and TCA notify maintenance cell of equipment outages. 
  ___ a.  Recognize equipment malfunction indication. 
  ___ b.  Respond to equipment malfunction indication. 
 
 ___ 12. TCO and TCA order ECCM operations. 
  ___ a.  Report any ECM to the controlling authority, using the proper format per the  
  MIJI report in the unit FSOP. 
     ___ b.  Conducts strobe engagements  
   ___ c.  Conducts range estimate engagements 
 
 ___ 13.  Implement SCUD ALERT procedures. 
  ___ a.  Battle short EPP and Radar Set. 










CM1/PCS Date:__________________________ Start Time: _____________     Score:  200 
 
CM2/PCS Date:__________________________  End Time:     _____________         Deducted ___ 
 
CM3/PCS Date:__________________________ Total Time: _____________   Total  ___ 
 
 




1.  Crew must achieve a minimum passing score of 140/200 for Gunnery Table certification. 
2.  Point deductions: 
a. Subtract 3 points for each incorrectly executed performance measure. 
b. Subtract 6 points for each missed performance measure. 
c. Subtract 30 points for the following:  
1) Each failure to activate / deactivate an ACO/MEZ within 30 seconds of the directed 
activation or deactivation time.   
2) Each hostile TBM or ABT the over runs a defended asset due to crew error. 
d. Subtract 30 points for each error made in Tab 1,5,6,54,55,70,71,73,76,78,79,81, or 85 made during 
the course of the air battle  
e. Subtract 61 points for each friendly aircraft engaged due to a crew error. 
 






Explanation for point deduction.  Include page # and step #  from MTP / TSOP 
/ FSOP and any other reference   
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The following Checklists are to be used by the Evaluator as a Guide Only. This checksheet will allow 
evaluators to easily assess whether a unit has achieved their directed AS. 
Part I   Alert State Verification Guide .                 
 ___ 1. Operational System (no NMC faults). 
  ___ A.  FP Status 
  ___ B.  Fault Data 
  ___ C.  OP Assess 
  ___ D.  Communications status  
 ___ 2. Back up data base available (spare OD, hard copy). 
 ___ 3.  Alignment, emplacement and coverage of RS and LS.  
 ___ 4.   Secure FM communications capability (Btry and ADC NET).  
 ___ 5.   System and  Site data books on hand.  
 ___ 6. Configure system IAW directed alert state: 
  ___  A.  Minimum S/Is selected: 
 ___ (1)  Weapons Control   
 ___ (2)  Friendly Protect 
 ___ (3)  Defend Areas 
 ___ (4)  Weapon Control Areas  
 ___ (5)  ID Areas  
 ___ (6)  Friends   
 ___ (7)  Unknowns  
 ___ (8)  Hostile 
 ___ (9)  Track Numbers 
 ___ (10)  SIF Enable 
 ___ (11)  Mode 4 Enable/Frequency Diversity  
 ___ (12)  Threshold High 
 ___ (13)  Radiate(TBM/ABT/Passive search) / TBM Auto Engage 
 ___ (14)  Semi-Auto Engage Mode 
 ___ (15)  ECCM Enable 
 ___ (16)  CARM Enable  
         ___ B.  All available launchers in standby/ operate as directed by  the ICC. 
         ___ C.  Ensure FP Status indicators posted IAW SSTO: 
 ___ (1)  WCS 
 ___ (2)  DEFCON 
 ___ (3)  MOC 
 ___ (4)  Alert State 
 ___ (5)  ADW 
          ___D.  Ensure TAB entries posted IAW  TSOP/ATO/SPINS: 
 ___ (1)  TAB 01 
 ___ (2)  TAB 02 
 ___ (3)  TAB 05 
 ___ (4)  TAB 06 
 ___ (5)  TAB 09 
          ___ (6)  TAB 14 
 ___ (7)  TAB 54 
 ___ (8)  TAB 55 
 ___ (9)  TAB 70 
 ___ (10) TAB 71 
 ___ (11) TAB 72 
 ___ (12) TAB 73 
 ___ (13) TAB 76 
 ___ (14) TAB 78 
 ___ (15) TAB 79 
 ___ (16) TAB 81 
 ___ (17) TAB 85 (all LSs) 
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The Checksheet below is a reference for Evaluators only. It is to be used by the Evaluator to assess 
the crew’s knowledge of the Patriot system.  Evaluators ask questions to ensure the crew fully 
understands the areas oulined below 
TCO/TCA Crew Proficiency/Knowledge  Guide  
 ___ 1.   Demonstrate understanding of ABT/ missile threat and the EDWA process. 
 ___ 2.   ABT/TBM defense capabilities and procedures. 
 ___ 3.   ID Procedures/Rules of Engagement 
 ___ A.  ID Procedures      
   ___ (1)  ID criteria (Friendly, Hostile, Assumed Friend, Unkown) 
 ___ (1) Manual/IFF Procedures (Manual/Auto, Garble , Mult Reply) 
 ___ (2) Tab 73 validation  
 ___ (3) Mode I vs. Mode IV use. 
 ___ (4) Lame Duck Procedures. 
 ___ B.  Engagement Procedures. 
   ___(1) ROE (Peace Time, War Time) 
  ___ (1) Centralized 
  ___ (2) Decentralized. 
  ___ (3) Autonomous 
  ___ (4) Independent 
 ___(2) Self defense Criteria (Peace Time, War Time) 
 ___(3) Slow Targets 
      ___(4)  ARMs 
 ___(5) TBMs 
 ___(6) Method of Fire (Salvo, Ripple, Modified Ripple, SLS)  
 ____4.  ECM operations (Strobe engagements, Range Assist method). 
 ____5.  Communications outage procedures: 
 ___ A.  Autonomous operations, 
 ___ B.  FU-FU operations. 
 ___ C .  Modification to SSTO. 
 ___ 6.   Denial and destruction plans.  
 ___ 7.   Missile hazard/misfire procedures. 
 ___ 8.   General Knowledge of TABS, Switch/Indicator entries. 
 
 ___ (A)  TAB 01 
 ___ (B)  TAB 02 
 ___ ©  TAB 05 
 ___ (D)  TAB 06 
 ___ (E)  TAB 09 
          ___ (F)  TAB 14 
 ___ (G)  TAB 54 
 ___ (H)  TAB 55 
 ___ (I)  TAB 70 
 ___ (J) TAB 71 
 ___ (K) TAB 72 
 ___ (L) TAB 73 
 ___ (M) TAB 76 
 ___ (N) TAB 78 
 ___ (O) TAB 79 
 ___ (P) TAB 81 
                             ___ (Q) TAB 85 (all LSs) 
 ___ 9.   Knowledge of communication plans.  
 ___ 10.  PAC3 modifications/remote launch capabilities . 
 ___ 11.  ARM Tactics/identification and CARM operations. 
 ___ 12.  STL procedures. 
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 ___ 13.  Mapping procedures.(A and C) 
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